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An affection regarding a thing we know not to exist in the present, and which we 
imagine as possible, is, other conditions being equal, more intense than if it re-
ferred to a contingent thing. 
On Human Bondage or the Strength of the Affections, 
Proposition XII. 
Time considered, affections that originate in Reason or are stimulated by it are 
stronger than those attributable to singular things that we regard as absent. 
On the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom, 
Proposition VII. 
Baruch Spinoza, Ethics. 
Summary 
This note examines the Integrity Pact (IP) methodology proposed by Transparency International to 
confront the problem of corruption in public procurement. The examination draws from a decision 
model for participants developed elsewhere, in which the critical elements are shown to be the 
vulnerability of the conditions under which the tender is conducted and the risk of bribing. The IP 
methodology intends to interfere with the central elements in individual tender instantiations by a 
process of discussion leading to mutual trust; participants and public officials sign a pledge of 
honesty. Disputes are to be resolved by private arbitration and allegedly enforcement is attained by 
force of a private contract between participants. Preferably, a civil society organization stimulates 
and monitors the process and acts as fiducial guarantor. Publicising proceedings stimulates discus-
sion and enhances transparency. All this is held to favourably affect the process, leading to better 
results. This, in turn, is held to affect the overall environment over time. In order to accommodate 
for the ethical dimension introduced by IPs, the present analysis incorporates an “ethical” factor 
operating over the conditions under which tenders are conducted. Ascertaining the operation of 
this hypothetical factor is an empirical question. 
The examination of IP premises, together with evidence collected from instantiations of the meth-
odology, plus the absence of comparative empirical data on bribery, leads to the conclusion that 
IPs do not heighten the risk of bribing for participants. Contrary to the methodology’s claim, en-
forcement, be it from arbitration or otherwise, is shown to be dependent on each particular envi-
ronment. Conditions under which particular tenders are conducted might be bettered, but not un-
conditionally, as the institutional framework perforce dominates private agreements. The influence 
of the “ethical” factor cannot be assessed for lack of empirical evidence, and the honesty pledge 
IPs rely on is argued to be devoid of significance. Although for lack of data the economic effi-
ciency of the methodology cannot be ascertained, there is no reason to suppose that IPs do not bet-
ter the outcomes piecewise. The methodology fails to address the problem of cartelisation that af-
fects public markets, and – perhaps due to the low frequency of its application – does not discuss 
measures to counterbalance the action of cartels. 
Interpreting the premises behind the IP idea, it is argued that they stem from a perspective on cor-
ruption rooted on morality rather than on the mechanisms that propitiate bribery. Thus, tackling 
individual instantiations is favoured over confronting systemic factors. 
IP guidelines stipulate that the absence of allegations of bribery in a tender authorises the sponsor-
ing NGO to announce that the tender was “clean”. It is argued that such manifestations of overcon-
fidence are hazardous for the reputation of NGOs that adopt the methodology. It is also argued that 
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the continuous involvement of NGOs with IPs raises questions about their entitlement to it, more-
over because NGOs are not bound by oversight and accountability constraints that formally charac-
terise State organisms. It is contended that for both governments and NGOs, promoting and par-
ticipating in IPs is a strategic decision that should be balanced with their effectiveness towards the 
aim of changing the institutional environment. 
Keywords: Control, corruption, integrity pact, public procurement, regulation. 
JEL classification numbers: D44, D84, H57, K23. 
 
Introduction 
Corruption in public procurement is almost universally recognised as being responsible for dis-
economies. Collusion between public officials and private suppliers, oiled by bribery, misdirects 
public expenditures, elevates prices, allows for non-performance of contract specifications and 
generally erodes the efficiency of public inversions. Reducing corruption in procurement is much 
needed to better the chances of countries to develop and to reduce social injustices. 
One of the strategies used to tackle the problem is the Integrity Pact (IP), developed by Transpar-
ency International (TI). The official exposition is [TI 2002b]. At their root, IPs seem to be based on 
the following assumptions: 
1.  Given that corruption in public procurement heightens transaction costs, hampers tech-
nological evolution and brings other systemic diseconomies, it is detrimental to the in-
terests of private firms. 
2.  Individual firms cannot effectively avoid bribing because they fear that other firms will 
bribe to win contracts. 
3.  As bribery introduces information asymmetry amongst participants, one way to reduce it 
is by sharing subjective information about values. 
4.  The participatory process of discussing and sharing values stimulates non-bribery col-
laboration among participants, while preserving business competition. 
An IP allows for participants and public officials to agree in writing to a set of rules to be applied 
to one specific tender. Within such an IP, agreement is also reached regarding conditions for par-
ticipation, decision criteria and other particularities. Participants and officials also agree on an 
“honesty pledge”, that is, a pledge by participants that they will not attempt to bribe officials and a 
pledge by officials that they will not accept bribes. Penalties for infringement of the pact are also 
included in the agreement. Wide publicity of proceedings is essential, as is the aggregation of ex-
perience stemming from particular instantiations. 
IPs draw a measure of conceptual justification by appealing to private interests, who are invited to 
adopt a proposed solution to the so-called “prisoner’s dilemma”, whereby the best strategy for par-
ticipants would be mutual collaboration (playing the procurement game fairly) rather than confron-
tation (bribing to win contracts). Originally, the intended target of IPs were transnational corpora-
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tions operating in third-world countries affected by serious institutional problems, and the main 
purpose was lowering the economic losses brought by bribes being extorted from holders of al-
ready decided big contracts.1 The arguments one finds in expositions aimed at specialised interna-
tional audiences are framed according to such a perspective.2 The rules for procurement prevailing 
in a given environment were taken as given, and changing or adapting the regulations to particular 
cases was not an objective. [TI 2002b] expanded the IP to “all the activities related to the contract 
from the pre-selection of bidders, the bidding and contracting proper, through the implementation, 
to the completion and operation”.3  Subjecting a tender to public discussion to ascertain whether its 
terms are fair vis à vis the extant regulations is part of the methodology. Moreover, some of the 
organizations that use it realise the significance of the rules of the game, and accordingly include in 
their practice the discussion of the terms of the tender. 
A third party, in principle a civil society organization, participates in the IP playing a variety of dif-
ferent roles, among them being the facilitator between the other parties and (preferably) monitor-
ing. Private arbiters resolve controversies and impose penalties. 
On laying out the “Main characteristics” of IPs, [TI 2002b] gives as the elements of the concept the 
following. The words “CORE” (absence of the item means the initiative cannot be called an Integ-
rity Pact), “HD” (for highly desirable) and “OP” (for optional) that appear between {curly brack-
ets} categorise the elements according to the same source.4 
1)  A pact (a contract) between a principal (a State office) and bidders. {Signing mandatory, HD, signing 
voluntary, OP.} 
2)  An undertaking by the principal (the contracting State institution) that its functionaries will not take or 
extort bribes, with “appropriate disciplinary or criminal sanctions in case of violation”. {CORE.} 
3)  A statement by each bidder that they did not and will not pay bribes “in order to obtain or retain” the con-
tract being procured. {CORE.} 
4)  An undertaking by all bidders that they will “disclose all payments made in connection with the contract 
in question [it is to be imagined that the intended reference here is not to only to the contract, but to the 
entire procurement process] to anybody”. {Disclosure of names, CORE; disclosure of payments, OP.} 
5)  The acceptance “that the no-bribery commitment and the disclosure obligation as well as the attendant 
sanctions remain in force” for the duration of the contract. 
6)  “Undertakings on behalf of a bidding company will be made ‘in the name and on behalf of the com-
pany’s’ CEO” [elsewhere it is admitted that the CEO can be of the national subsidiary of a transnational 
corporation, if that is the case]. {HD} 
7)  An advice to bidders that they should have a Code of Conduct explicitly condemning corruption and a 
compliance program thereof. {OP} 
8)  “The use of arbitration as conflict resolution mechanism”. {CORE} 
9)  “A pre-announced set of sanctions” for violators {CORE}, “including (some or all):  
o  denial or loss of contract; {HD} 
o  forfeiture of the bid security and performance bond; {HD} 
o  liability for damages to the principal and the competing bidders; {HD} and 
                                                             
1   See e.g. the opening statements of [Wiehen and Mohn 1998]. 
2   [Wiehen 1999], [Wiehen 2000]. 
3   [TI 2002b] p. 4. 
4   [TI 2002b] pp. 4f and pp. 25ff. Numbering by CWA. 
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o  debarment of the violator by the principal for an appropriate period of time [blacklisting]. {HD}”  
The text continues to state that 
As such, the IP will establish contractual rights and obligations of all the parties to a governing contract and 
thus eliminate uncertainties as to the quality, applicability and enforcement of criminal and contractual legal 
provisions in a given country. This means that applying the IP concept can be done anywhere without the nor-
mally lengthy process of changing the local laws. 
These characteristics (we will refer to them as “Elements”) are not and could not be cast in iron, 
and organizations willing to promote IPs enjoy wide discretion in adapting to their respective envi-
ronments, provided that the “core” elements are in place. This leads to a natural diversity of appli-
cations, according to which countries and which organizations are involved.5 
It must be kept in mind that, because it depends on experience, the Integrity Pact methodology is a 
“work-in-permanent-progress”.  Spreading the methodology is mainly done by word of mouth 
rather than by recourse to written material. The scarcity of information on actual IPs makes it addi-
tionally difficult to take a snapshot of the methodology’s application and examine what comes up 
in the film. 
The mechanism of IPs has not been subjected to scrutiny in the literature, be it on anti-corruption 
in general or on procurement in particular. A few case studies were conducted in 2001-2002.6 The 
present observations correspond to a first approximation to the Integrity Pact methodology. We 
will look at its rationale and will examine practical applications as reported in the extant docu-
ments and in texts produced by personalities and representatives of organizations that promote it. 
[The first section addresses from a formal perspective the question of bribing or not bribing in pro-
curement, and the placement of the ethical factor posited by IPs. This entails using some elemen-
tary mathematics. This was kept at a minimum, but nevertheless the reader who wants to skip the 
symbology and the mathematics can safely do so, needing only to follow the text, which – hope-
fully – is written urbanely.] 
 
1.  The briber’s calculus 
The argument for collaboration as a better strategy than confrontation in certain social situations 
stems from discussions around the so-called “prisoner’s dilemma”. However, the application of the 
dilemma to the procurement situation is inadequate. See [CWA 2003b] for the argument leading to 
this conclusion. But let us not despair in following the game-theoretical approach, because it can 
                                                             
5   It seems that in practice the term “Integrity Pact” is used loosely. In Mexico, for instance, an unilateral pledge of 
honesty and fair dealings regarding future tenders by a principal (Consejo de Promoción Turística, 
www.sectur.gob.mx/wb/distribuidor.jsp?seccion=8914) is presented as an IP. In the same country, a form imposed 
by a principal (PEMEX, www.cnec.org.mx/info/?_x=CNEC1031844889.doc) to its contractors is so titled; simi-
larly in Peru (RENIEC, www.reniec.gob.pe/cp0002_2002.pdf). 
6   [Holsen et. al. 2002]. 
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be illuminating. In order to better depict the situation in procurement, one must start with the fac-





                                                            
The probability of a bidder winning a clean tender. 
The likelihood of participants deciding to bribe. 
The penalties applicable to firms found guilty of bribery. 
The probability of bribers being caught, arising from the efficiency of the control 
mechanisms in place. 
The third and fourth factors compound the risk. Risk is the value of the probable loss, relative to an 
intended objective. The same happens with the expectation of winning cleanly, which depends on 
the contract’s value and on the probability of winning. 
a. The participants’ decision tree 
Using the elements just listed, the decision tree governing a two-participant bidder’s game is the 
following. The game starts by selecting at random the participant that plays first. The branches in-
side the boxes do not belong to the decision tree proper, representing the alternatives that are not 
subjected to the players’ will, leading to the outcomes. 
1 loses
1/2 















C11-E-B1  1 wins 








7   For the reasoning leading to the elements used in this section, see [CWA 2003a]. The sequel extensively quotes 
from that reference. 
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Player 1 has probability ½ of being the first to play. If 1 bribes, then 2 cannot bribe. Player 2 can 
only bribe if 1 plays cleanly. If 2 is the first to play, the tree is the same, swapping 1 and 2. The 
various components have the following meanings: 
p1  The probability of Player 1 winning the contract in open bidding (so that the probabil-
ity of 2 winning is p2 = 1 – p1); 
u  The systemic likelihood of bribing (the percentage of all contracts in the market in 
question that are biased); 
qj   The likelihood of player j bribing, depending on the probability of bribery occurring 
in that market (u), on the number of participants and on factors peculiar to each j; if 
q1, q2  1, these likelihoods obey to 1 – u = (1 – q1)(1 – q2); 
Cj0   The value of the contract awarded to Bidder j if he is the winner in the absence of 
bribes; 
Cj1   The value of the contract won with a bribe Bj (and associated diseconomies) by Bid-
der j; we will consider an overprice in excess of the bribe, so that Cj1 – Bj > Cj0; 
E   The regular expenses incurred in participating (excluding bribes; for simplicity, de-
fined as the same for both participants and normalized to 0 in the sequel); 
Bj   The amount paid by j as a bribe; 
R  The penalty paid if a briber is caught red-handed; for simplicity, the same for both 
participants; expressed as a percentage of the average contract value in the market in 
question. 
k  The probability of a briber being caught given that the tender was rigged.  
Now, if Bidder 1 decides to bribe, then he wins the contract, pays the bribe back and discounts the 
expenses. Bidder 2 is just a bystander. Because 1 bribed, he incurs in the risk of paying the penalty 
R with probability k. If Bidder 1 decides not to bribe, then it is Bidder 2’s turn to play. He can de-
cide either to bribe or not to bribe. If he does bribe, he gets the contract under the same conditions 
just stated. If 2 decides not to bribe, then the tender is openly contested and the contract goes to 1 
with probability p1 or to 2 with probability 1 – p1. Whatever the case, players pay the amount cor-
responding to the expenses to participate. 
Choosing the best strategy for playing the game depends on the vulnerability of the tender (the 
probability u, stemming from the propensities of each player to bribe), on the risk of being caught 
in bribery (the penalty R and the probability k) and at least in principle on the probability of cleanly 
winning the contract. Suppose that the conditions are lax. Suppose also that there are penalties, but 
that the likelihood of a briber being caught is small. Bidder 1 evaluates that if he bribes, the con-
tract would be his with small risk of incurring in penalties. He also reasons that if he refrains from 
bribing, then the opponent will evaluate the situation similarly, so his decision would be to bribe. 
Therefore, in order not to be duped, 1’s decision again would be in favour of bribing. If 2 knows 
that 1 did not bribe, then he holds all the trumps. Observe that for either participant, the probability 
of cleanly winning the contract does not play a role in the reasoning. Such is the situation in cor-
rupted environments, and presumably suggests the allusions to the prisoner’s dilemma. 
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If the opportunities to bribe (u) are few and the likelihood of being penalised for bribery (k) is high, 
then it would be better to take one’s chances in the open bidding process. And for this one must 
enhance one’s own probability of offering the lower price and/or other conditions in order to win 
(by cutting costs, developing better production processes etc.). If everybody does that continuously 
over time, prices fall down (and the law of diminishing returns takes hold). Of course, if the oppor-
tunities to attempt bribery are few, then on average bidders will decide to bribe less often. If, fur-
thermore, bribes are often detected when practiced, then the risk grows and the rational justifica-
tion to bribe loses weight. 
What one gets from the model is confirmation of the common belief that in unhealthy environ-
ments participants who play cleanly most likely lose. Notice that this holds even for fairly “clean” 
environments. 
For the “game masters” – i.e., the planners and regulators of procurement policy –, the most ra-
tional aim would be to develop a procurement environment where the conditions maximally pre-
vent opportunities for bribery and where the risk of bribers being caught is guaranteed to be ex-
tremely high. Notice that this is not simply a matter of stipulating stiff penalties, but also of mini-
mising, in the regulations, the conditions that allow public officials to direct tenders, and of en-
hancing the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. As tightening controls is expensive, pre-
venting bribery has a better chance of achieving success. 
The Integrity Pact official literature indirectly addresses the formal conditions governing a tender, 
from which stems the likelihood to bribe (our factor u), even if, sometimes, the conditions are con-
sidered as given, and the apparent intention is to ascertain that the rules of the game are followed 
as given. Thus, 
Once the decision has been made to go ahead with the project as designed, the government needs to: Decide 
whether it will use a general contractor or individual contractors; prepare, or get prepared by consultants, the 
bidding documents […].8 
Although the methodology in itself does not aim at reforming the institutional environment, but 
instead applies to particular instantiations, it does aim to create, by repetition, a climate of trust in 
the procedure, so subjectively altering the overall conditions. Furthermore, on describing the ob-
jectives of IPs, [TI 2002b] contends that “The IP helps enhance public trust in government con-
tracting and hence should contribute to improve the credibility of government procedures and ad-
ministration in general”. This is repeated in the same section thus: “Beyond the individual contract 
in question, the IP is of course intended to create confidence and trust in the public decision-
making process in general […] and public support for the government’s procurement, privatisation 
and licensing programs”.9 
b. Collusion 
Before proceeding, we must introduce a possibility that till now was not mentioned, but must be 
taken into account if the problem is to be credibly depicted. If procurement is addressed from the 
                                                             
8   [Wiehen 1999] p. 24. 
9   [TI 2002b], p. 4. Observe the emphasis on “privatisation and licensing programs”. 
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perspective of the “collaboration vs. confrontation” dichotomy, then there is one type of collabora-
tion that in actual practice often happens among participants of procurement in certain sectors (no-
toriously, public works), namely, colluding to fix minimum prices, erecting barriers to new en-
trants and adopting the “merry-go-round” method of divvying up the market among a number of 
firms that in time get all contracts stemming from a series of different rigged biddings. The pre-
arranged losers guarantee to offer prices that are higher than the pre-defined winner for each turn 
of the wheel. Obviously, this method can only work if new would-be entrants are either co-opted 
or, if they disagree, are subjected to entry barriers. In stable markets, the survival of such a method 
would be impossible without the public agents’ collaboration. Note also that collusion to fix 
prices, being a private matter circumscribed to suppliers, does not directly depend on the institu-
tional framework governing procurement.10 
In the presence of a low risk of detection, such a collaboration is in fact more attractive to partici-
pants than actually competing in open tenders, because, as the decision is preordained, no extra 
effort need to be applied to offer a lower price in any given tender. This has the additional advan-
tage of considerably lowering the “normal” cost of participating. In clean open tenders, where all 
participants have more or less the same likelihood of winning – the typical situation in stable mar-
kets –, the expectation of losses due to the cost of participating in a sequence of tenders mounts 
with the number of contestants. But in merry-go-round schemes, why should anyone spend more 
than the absolute minimum to draft proposals? This is why participants try to eliminate the cost 
altogether, leaving the responsibility of drafting losing proposals to the pre-ordained winner, or 
even use especially projected common templates (which is why one of the techniques to identify 
the action of cartels is to examine proposals looking for stylistic and even physical similarities). 
In the long run, cartelisation is of course detrimental to the economic sector in question (as such a 
strategy stifles progress), but experience abundantly shows that few firms put a sector’s strategic 
interests before their own immediate goals.11 As Lord Keynes remarked, in the long run we’re all 
dead. If this dimension is introduced in our “bidder’s calculus” and if more broadly we include the 
                                                             
10   In 1993, in São Paulo, Brazil, one journalist managed to penetrate two meetings of about 60 civil construction con-
tractors held in their Association, in which they first attributed to each of an extended list of future contracts which 
would be the corresponding “winning” prices and then proceeded to run a bingo to decide which firm would “win” 
each contract. Firms not lucky enough were guaranteed chunks of the spoil from future subcontracting by “win-
ners”. In schemes like that, dissenting firms are kept apart by their own volition – that is, they are economically 
threatened by the others and “voluntarily” renounce to compete. Oscar Pilagallo and Xico Sá, series in Folha de S. 
Paulo, 1993, winner of one of the Esso journalism awards of that year.  In July 2003, a cartel of ca. 20 suppliers of 
gravel for contractors was discovered, also in the state of São Paulo, complete with specially developed computer 
software to randomize offers’ details. In September 2003, would-be contenders in an auction for the concession of 
small-capacity public transportation for the city of São Paulo (a very huge city, with very huge long-term conces-
sions) colluded when forming consortiums, in order to guarantee that no one was left out; in this case, the public 
agent responsible for the auction was privy to the arrangements. On October 27, 2003, the media reported on a car-
tel formed in the Southern state of Rio Grande do Sul by 18 private security firms to fix prices and distribute public 
contracts among members. 
11  Apropos the “bingo” scandal, at the time the author heard from a prominent Brazilian contractor that fixing mini-
mum prices in a given market is a perfectly admissible procedure undertook by suppliers in defence of commercial 
interests perceived as being threatened. The practice is explicitly prohibited by the Brazilian procurement law. 
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consideration that the “liquid” price arising from a rigged bidding tends to be higher than the 
equivalent in an open bidding, then the scales are further tipped in the direction of corruption. So, 
in order to lower the likelihood of bribery contaminating tenders, the various components must be 
further strengthened. 
c. The IP ethical factor 
If one accepts the “briber’s calculus” metaphor as a plausible depiction of the problem at hand, 
how does the IP procedure enter the game? The purpose of IPs is not to enhance the likelihood of 
somebody winning a contract, nor to heighten the value of a clean contract vis à vis a “dirty” one, 
but to do away with the amount paid in bribes (together with other uncertainties and diseconomies 
entailed by a faulty environment). Thus, the only remaining variables at the reach of the IP are the 
conditions, the penalties and the probability of corruption being detected. IPs aim at stimulating a 
subjective ethical factor, and also strive to opening up the conditions for participation, thus pre-
sumably lowering the probability of entry barriers being erected, but the question remains as to 
whether the economic stimuli to bribe under such conditions are effectively superseded. 
We must try to imagine what modifications should be introduced in our model in order to accom-
modate the ethical commitment of participants and public officials not to participate in bribery. 
According to the doctrine, such commitment is justified by mutual trust emerging from a process 
of negotiating the conditions of the tender, the penalties incurred in case of non-compliance etc. 
However, jumping from a commitment not to bribe to actually not performing the act cannot be 
introduced in the model because it would simply do away with the very option to bribe, and then 
there would be no decision to make and the game would become trivial. We could weaken this ab-
solute (and absolutely implausible) condition and adopt instead the stipulation that the IP aims at 
diminishing the likelihood of participants deciding to bribe. Then, one possible adaptation would 
be to add somewhere an “ethical factor” (which we will name that would strengthen other fac-
tors. This can be accomplished in the game model by making the probability q of a player deciding 
to bribe dependent of the “ethical” factor (so that q = q(), entailing that u = u()) in such a way as 
to make q approach 0 when  is high enough. (In principle, k should also be subjected to the same 
operation, but we will not complicate matters.) Environments where the probability of bribing 
(stemming from the conditions under which tenders are performed) is small and monitoring is 
weak would require a very strong ethical factor (close to 1), while in healthier environments, 
where erecting entry barriers is difficult, the ethical factor would not be as relevant. In an iterated 
IP game, the influence of the “ethical” factor could be made to grow with previous successes, thus 
allowing for the “change of climate” effect alluded to in p. 8. Therefore, the “briber’s calculus” 
modified as it was just suggested would – formally – incorporate the ethical commitments of IPs as 
a factor operating to reduce the propensity to bribe. 
To recapitulate the discussion up to this point, within the scope of the proposed game-theoretical 
model it was found that the proposition that IPs are effective to reduce the propensity of bidders to 
pay bribes translates into the statements that objective conditions governing tenders can be en-
hanced (thus lowering probability q), that penalties can be stiffened (making R bigger), that control 
mechanisms can be strengthened (enhancing k) and that there exists a subjective “ethical” factor 
( that, when strong enough, is able to supersede other factors and to induce the rational decision 
not to bribe. Simply stating that such factors operate as desired on the rational decision-making 
process in Integrity Pacts is clearly not enough. Empirical evidence must be presented. 
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d. The agent’s decision tree 
Let us not forget the side of the public officials. They may also be construed as participating in a 
“bribee’s calculus” game. It is easy to see that the decision tree for them is much simpler (already 
including an ethically-modified likelihood for the occurrence of bribing, which for simplicity we 
consider to be the same as previously). Given a tender, the meanings of the various elements are 
the same as in the former diagram, and so are the values, excepting for the penalty Q. The outcome 
for not taking bribes is symbolised as T. The best strategy for public officials is straightforward. If 
the system easily allows for entry barriers to be erected (and the hypothetical “ethical” factor is 
low), then the likelihood of his deciding to take bribes turns out to be high. And if they take bribes, 
then they benefit from the amount B of the bribe, incurring in the corresponding risk. If the risk is 
low, then the propensity to participate in corruption is enhanced. Note that normally T = 0. Differ-
ently from firms, there are no material gains to be earned by public officials that do not take bribes. 
This is nothing more than the classical problem with the public sector: There are no direct material 
incentives for not abusing power. (A similar diagram appears in [Klitgaard 1991] Ch; 3, with the 
difference that a “moral penalty” is added to the material penalty Q. However, as there is no way to 
quantify moral penalties, Klitgaard’s diagram is not a model but only a verbal metaphor, not ame-







1 – u() 
u() 
PO 
Takes a bribe 
Doesn‘t take a bribe 
For the agent, the expectation remains positive (the official is not caught and retains the bribe) till 
the control and enforcement factor reaches a certain level, regardless of the systemic vulnerability, 
and gets negative from that point on. The turning point depends on the ratio between the penalty 
and the bribe, in the same manner as previously discussed in relation with participants. Using the 
same reasoning we applied then (p. 8), from this and from the observation that for the majority of 
officials penalties are usually stiff in comparison to the bribes taken, one concludes that the preva-
lence of corruption in some environments directly stems from lack of control and enforcement – in 
these environments, perforce the control probability is less than the “clean” threshold. 
e. Questions to be answered 
The questions we are left with, and must compare with the odds we discussed in this section, are: 
Do IPs offer incentives for public officials not abusing power?  
 Do IPs define stiffer penalties for firms and public officials? Recalling that, as ar-
gued above, penalties affect the decision about to bribe or not to bribe only insofar 
as the risk factor is high enough. So, the second question: 







                                                            
Do IPs heighten the probability of bribery being discovered? That is, do they estab-
lish better control mechanisms? 
Do IPs reduce the probability of bidders deciding to bribe and public officials de-
ciding to take or extort bribes? This divides into asking whether they diminish the 
opportunities for entry barriers to be erected and whether ethical influences super-
sede others. 
And, in general: 
Do IPs contribute to get better results in procurement? 
Do IPs contribute to perfecting the overall procurement environment? 
We will examine those questions as we go. Such examination will address conceptual assumptions 
accompanying IPs as well as the empirical evidence available as to prevailing conditions and re-
sults. Before we proceed, it is worth mentioning that the importance attributed to the various com-
ponents affecting bribery (the conditions under which the tender is held, the penalties, the effi-
ciency of control mechanisms and the ethical factor) varies with IP practitioners. There are those, 
like the Colombian organization that is leader in the field, which heavily favour the subjective 
component symbolised by the ethical factor. And there are others, like the Ecuatorian, that primar-
ily direct their attention to the conditions governing the tender. 
 
2.   Incentives not to take bribes 
The question about public officials being offered specific incentives not to abuse power in IPs can 
be straightforwardly answered in the negative. Although one practitioner states that in the IPs her 
organisation promotes the functionaries “agree on rewards and penalties” arising from discus-
sions,12 there is no mention to rewards in the actual IPs that was possible to consult. 
This is not to say that subjective incentives to principals (as opposed to their agents) to adopt IPs 
are absent. On the contrary, becoming associated with the promotion of mechanisms that allegedly 
promote cleaner tenders is a political advantage, especially for senior and, notably, elected offi-
cials. As noted in p. 8, this is an important component of the strategy of promoting the IP method-
ology. It must be kept in mind, however, that such incentives have no objective relation to specific 
tenders. Principals are not the same thing as their agents. Moreover, as the political mores abun-
dantly demonstrate, verbal self-identification with honest practices is not identical to actually prac-
tising what is preached. 
Naturally, the practicability of defining positive incentives for not performing secret acts (taking 
bribes) is debatable. Be it as it may, the proper scope under which to discuss incentives to public 
functionaries is performance evaluation. We will not go into this, but only point out that evaluating 
the performance of public officials has to do with the whole administrative institutional frame-
work, not being reasonable to expect that isolated offices would be able to apply special adminis-
trative regulations pertaining to their officials’ wages, rewards and so forth. A different question is 
 
12   [Ospina 2001] p. 9. 
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whether not abusing power gets subjective enhancement as a consequence of the IP “ethical” fac-
tor. This can only be answered by recourse to empirical data comparing IP-driven tenders with 
non-IP-governed procurement. As will be repeatedly seen in the sequel, the absence of empirical 
evidence stands in the way of reaching a conclusion. 
 
3.   The risks of bribing 
There are two components in the risk: The penalties incurred if one is caught bribing and the prob-
ability of somebody being caught bribing. We begin with 
a. Penalties 
We recall that among the “Elements” of IPs there are the “core” requirements to include 
2)   An undertaking by the principal (the contracting State institution) that its functionaries will not take or 
extort bribes, with “appropriate disciplinary or criminal sanctions in case of violation”.  
9)   “A pre-announced set of sanctions” for violators, “including (some or all):  
o  denial or loss of contract;  
o  forfeiture of the bid security and performance bond;  
o  liability for damages to the principal and the competing bidders; and 
o  debarment of the violator by the principal for an appropriate period of time [blacklisting].”  
We also recall the contention reproduced in p. 5 that 
[…] the IP will establish contractual rights and obligations of all the parties to a governing contract and thus 
eliminate uncertainties as to the quality, applicability and enforcement of criminal and contractual legal provi-
sions in a given country. This means that applying the IP concept can be done anywhere without the normally 
lengthy process of changing the local laws.13 
The statement is very strong. It says that IPs are binding no matter the legal environment they are 
exercised in (“anywhere”). Because the IP contract purportedly “eliminate uncertainties […] in a 
given country”, it effectively says that the rights and duties expressed in the “Elements” would be 
enforceable irrespective of the law, “without the normally lengthy process of changing” it. It is also 
contended that “The concept of a contractual arrangement appeals to many governments as well as 
corporations acting globally”.14 
But how is it possible for an isolated State (or private, for that matter) organization to arbitrarily 
define “disciplinary and criminal sanctions” for violators? How can the signers of a private agree-
ment define sanctions such as those listed under Element 9 if they are not defined by law? Public 
agents are usually subjected to regulations specifying rights, duties and punishments for breaching 
them. As for companies contracting with the State, it is true that not all country regulations define 
penalties if they participate in collusion, bribery etc. But in any case, how can a private agreement 
define punishments and penalties, including criminal, at will? All this might perhaps be possible in 
                                                             
13  Also found in [Wiehen 2000] p. 91 and other references by the same author. This formulation found its way into 
[WCD 2000], p. 249. 
14   [Wiehen 2000] p. 92. 
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environments where the rule of law is essentially absent (even then enforcement would be prob-
lematic), but certainly not “anywhere”. 
Under a more understanding stance, it might be that by “appropriate disciplinary and criminal 
sanctions” it is meant sanctions provided for by law, to violations likewise defined by law.15 As the 
same source somewhat contradictorily puts it, “In substance, these commitments are nothing other 
than an agreement to respect and apply the existing laws of [the country] and the other party’s 
country of residence”.16 Leaving aside the improbable willingness of any single participant to sign 
something binding it to all the other participants’ countries’ laws, even if the agreement is limited 
to existing laws there would be no reasonable grounds to maintain that enforcement would be 
attainable by “contractual rights and obligations”. After all, due process (investigation, 
prosecution, defence etc.) is at least theoretically guaranteed in most legal systems. Under normal 
circumstances, either a complaint about corruption in a procurement process finds its way to 
administrative and/or criminal court or there would be no possibility of punishment. And so, the 
distance between enforceable and non-enforceable dispositions is explicit in a Mexican IP 
(although the absence of almost all other “core” Elements rises doubts about the arrangement being 
an IP at all): “The content of the [ethical declaration] do not juridically bind subscribers, since it is 
an ethical commitment”.17 
                                                            
A third possibility is that IPs should define penalties in excess of the law, but not encroaching on 
it. These would be essentially limited to material compensation, but even then conditionally: If the 
firm is found guilty of bribery etc. in a court of law, then, and only then, it would have to pay com-
pensation to the others by force of “contractual rights and obligations”. Nevertheless, in [TI 2002b] 
a different view is presented. It is contended as an example that 
[…] German practice is to treat a no-contest statement or an admission of guilt as equally persuasive [as a 
criminal conviction], and recently the practice is emerging of considering it as adequate evidence of a viola-
tion if “on the basis of the facts available there are no material doubts”.18 
No information is given about what type of controversy the situation refers to, or the amounts in-
volved. The premise operating in such reasoning is that the accused either did not contest the accu-
sation or confessed to it. Transporting this to a public procurement situation is not totally outside 
the realm of possibility, but anchoring an entire enforcement mechanism on the likelihood of a 
firm suspected of bribery voluntarily confessing to it or even not denying the act, and thus subject-
ing itself to pay sizable amounts of money in compensation, stresses credibility. Not to mention 
that having paid a separate compensation might be construed as evidence of guilt in a court of law. 
A fourth and last possibility, which essentially follows the line just commented, is that penalties 
are expected to be voluntarily self-applied. The Colombian “Compartel 1” IP, reproduced in [TI 
2002b] pp. 70ff as model, states that a firm found guilty of corruption “pledges to refrain from par-
ticipating in procurement […] for five years […]”. Likewise, functionaries guilty of taking bribes 
 
15   But see p. 36. 
16   [Wiehen 1999] p. 28. 
17   http://www.shcp.gob.mx/estruct/ahisa/ahisa_5.pdf p. 39. 
18   [TI 2002] p. 9. No source is given to the quotation. 
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“commit to declare themselves non-qualified to work in any public or private telecommunication 
entity for five years […]”.19 Thus, it was expected that such promises would be honoured because 
the culprits, having been found guilty of criminal acts capitulated in an ethical commitment, never-
theless would remain voluntarily bound by the very same ethical commitment. 
We must examine the particular role played by requiring that participants and public officials sign 
a pledge not to become involved in bribery and generally follow the IP methodology as to its legal-
ity and enforceability. If the State establishes by law a set of rules, then it is not clear why it would 
be necessary for people to affirm in writing that they will follow such rules. The enforcement 
power of the State and the obligatory knowledge of the law by participants (alleging ignorance of 
the law in order to avoid the consequences of breaching it is not acceptable in any legal system, 
even less when it comes to transactions with the State) would not change if the oath were not re-
quired. Nevertheless, the rules are no less enforceable because of the pledge, and there might be a 
subjective advantage in including such a requirement in the agreement. 
The situation is not as straightforward when the requirement to adhere to IP mechanisms is in-
cluded informally in an environment, but is not provided for in the regulations. In a reasonably de-
veloped legal environment, such a requirement would be at least subjected to controversy. 
The contention that IPs are applicable to each and every legal environment might be discussed un-
der another angle: Whether or not it makes sense, from the point of view of IP proponents, to re-
quire that every interested firm signs IPs in order to become able to participate in tenders. IP litera-
ture presents the matter as an open question: 
[…] experience up to now did not demonstrate whether it is better to make the signing mandatory from the 
start or whether it is better to negotiate the IP with the competitors until agreement is reached on a pact that 
then will be signed by everybody.20,21 
In most reasonably developed legal environments, it is very difficult to imagine that a requirement 
to sign something that is not required by law, stipulating conditions likewise not necessarily con-
templated by the law, would be enforceable. In fact, the requirement would hardly be legal and at-
tempts to prohibit the participation of non-signatories would be open to challenge. According to 
[TI 2002a], this happened in Milan, Italy, where a number of firms went to court against one or 
more IPs. The cases were pending ruling at the time of this writing. In a Mexican situation, it is 
explicitly stated that “Subscribing the unilateral statement of integrity is a voluntary act from par-
ticipants and the absence of such document is not sufficient reason to disqualify any registered par-
ticipant”.22 
                                                             
19   [TI 2002b] p. 72. 
20   [TI 2002b] p. 6. 
21  [Ospina 2001] p. 28 advocates that on being mandatory, “the integrity pact would turn into just one additional for-
mal requirement that must be signed […] along with all the other forms needing to be signed for a firm’s eligibility 
to participate in the bidding or competition”. This source consistently stresses the participatory and voluntary char-
acter of the IP as its main capital, and likewise her organization includes self-perfectioning as one of its strategic 
aims. See www.transparenciacolombia.org.co/formacion_cambio/1formacion_ca_cu_vol.htm. Nevertheless, see be-
low the participation of this same organization in efforts to make IPs mandatory. 
22   www.shcp.gob.mx/estruct/ahisa/ahisa_5.pdf p. 39. 
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The fact that the doubts expressed above are not born from mere abstract speculation is demon-
strated by an interchange between a non-identified interested party and an official of the Colom-
bian Ministry of Communications around the contract stemming from an IP-governed auction23 for 
the concession of licensing for Personal Communication Services in that country. It is worth quot-
ing the exchange at length.24 
Interested party: The document titled “Integrity Pact”, which the concession-holders are required25 to sign, 
describes conducts typified in the Penal Code […] and [consists in] an arbitration pact in whose formation 
and operation, as well as in the procedures to be performed before them, there is the intervention of parties 
not part [of the auction/contract], with the faculty of imposing pecuniary penalties […] and ordering the con-
tract’s termination. [However], as that faculty [belongs to the State], and the State is not permitted to re-
nounce to its exercise, it cannot be subjected to arbitration. [In view of this], recourse is made to the subter-
fuge […] of stating that the contract was terminated by mutual consent. Questions: 1) Can the State, without 
violating […] the Constitution, require that a pact is signed not to violate the Penal Code? 2) The violation of 
penal norms is not amenable to transaction, and therefore the arbitration pact cannot refer to them. Thus, can 
Arbiters address matters defined by the Penal Code or exercise prerogatives that belong to the State? Can Ar-
biters declare that someone incurred in cause for dis-habilitation? 
Official:  1) […] The Pact does not consist in the agreement you state, but in a pledge where the commitment 
to morality is reiterated […] and, in case of non-compliance, a monetary sanction applicable once the pre-
established procedure has been followed, which is independent of the State’s proceedings […] following a 
violation of the laws. […] In case of violation of legal duties, there is a pre-defined pecuniary sanction that in 
no way precludes the exercise of [other legal procedures]. Can Arbiters declare that someone incurred in 
cause for dis-habilitation? [No]. The disposition generates obligations that, in case of non-compliance, allow 
for the corresponding responsibilities and indemnities. That is, the proponent penalised by the Arbiters can 
validly participate in a procurement or contest sponsored by the Communications Ministry […]. 
This was a consultation answered by an administrative functionary. One can imagine what would 
happen in the legal arena in a concrete case. It is to be noted that, according to the understanding of 
the official quoted, the “highly desirable” condition of blacklisting would not be applicable.26 
Moreover, from this one surmises that the whole “core” element of special penalties an IP should 
define are not enforceable in that country under the private agreement of an IP. Indeed, if the func-
tionary’s interpretation was not mistaken, it follows that, according to the definition of IP “core” 
elements, the Colombian IP in question can be called an Integrity Pact by a hair’s breath, and only 
because it includes a pecuniary penalty payable to the other participants. 
                                                             
23  One single proponent (who got the concession) participated in this auction.. According to the auction’s announce-
ment (www.pcs.gov.co/docs/Pliego_de_Condiciones.doc), the IP was to be monitored by the organization Trans-
parencia por Colombia under the provision of Law 555/2000, Art. 5, paragraph – however, soon after the provision 
was judged unconstitutional. 
24   www.pcs.gov.co/docs/preguntas_respuestas/respuestas_proponente.pdf. Access to this file was discontinued soon 
after it was fetched. 
25    Required, not invited. The reference is to the document found at  www.pcs.gov.co/docs/adenda5/An-
exo_2_Pacto_de_Integridad_con_cambios_adenda_5.pdf. 
26  Blacklisting ruled by arbiters was included in prior drafts of this tender, but eliminated. See Ibid., p. 6. The same 
document provided for blacklisting by the principal (p. 7), but from the exchange just quoted it is to be surmised 
that it would not be enforceable for lack of legal footing. 
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It so happens that the Colombian regulations pertaining to procurement (Law 80/1993) do not even 
address bribery nor do they define any penalties applicable to corruptors. The only possible conse-
quence for firms would be the cancellation of the contract, provided that it was celebrated “with 
abuse or deviation of power” from some public official,
27 which, of course, must be proved. The 
reasons a public office can unilaterally claim to terminate an ongoing contract (Art. 17) do not in-
clude corruption. Public officials are subjected to penalties for “abuse or deviation of authority”, 
stemming from Title XV of the Colombian Penal Code. The Ecuatorian law is even more permis-
sive.28 There is no mention to corruption and suppliers suffer no penalties. Unilateral termination 
of the contract under the initiative of the principal can only happen (Art. 104) for bureaucratic-
operational reasons. The Mexican general law on procurement (Title 6, Art. 60) does mention cul-
pable behaviour from firms, which are subjected to fines and blacklisting (but, curiously, not can-
cellation of the contract). The same with that country’s public works law (Title 7, Art. 78). 
We conclude that IPs very fractionally, if at all, stiffen the penalties payable by participants in cor-
rupted schemes, but, as one would expect, such added penalties are only applicable if and when the 
party is found guilty in a court of law. It is hardly plausible, although not altogether impossible, 
that firms would agree to pay separate compensation otherwise. 
c. Control mechanisms and enforcement 
The risk of indulging in bribery depends on the size of the penalties and the probability of being 
caught. When such probability is very low, the risk approaches zero. We need to query whether IPs 
enhance that probability. This depends on the presence of monitoring mechanisms. Opening up the 
process for public discussion is an important component of IPs, and likewise getting promises 
from public officials that rules will be followed, and both can be interpreted as parts of control. 
Otherwise, IPs are not required to establish special monitoring mechanisms, although the “Ele-
ments” specify the need for 
4)  An undertaking by all bidders that they will “disclose all payments made in connection with the contract 
in question [it is to be imagined that the intended reference here is not to only to the contract, but to the 
entire procurement process] to anybody”.  
Disclosure of names is “core”, disclosure of payments is optional. Participants in IPs are not re-
quired to report suspicions of corrupt practices,29 although one practitioner states that “Because of 
the integrity pact’s ethics-related and voluntary nature, the key to following through on it is to 
stipulate in the text of the pact all signatories’ obligation to report any irregular process-related act 
of which they become aware”.30 Thus, the Colombian “Compartel 1” IP mentioned previously did 
define reporting of suspicions as a condition for interested parties to participate. It is not informed 
whether it happened. Other IPs reproduced in [TI 2002b] and surveyed elsewhere do not seem to 
include a requirement to report suspicions of bribery. There is, however, provision for monitoring 
                                                             
27   Law 80/1993,  Art. 44, item 3. 
28   Law 272/2001. 
29   Pointing this out should not to be understood as holding that such a requirement would in any way enhance the like-
lihood that reporting would happen. 
30   [Ospina 2001] p. 30 
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and supervision, in which it is declared that these “should be specified and in particular those for 
dealing with dangers, suspicions or actual instances of corrupt practices should be clearly defined”, 
so that implicitly it is expected that suspicions are to be reported. The very existence of a monitor-
ing procedure is necessarily reported in the IP proceedings: “The ultimate result of such monitor-
ing and supervision should be a statement at the end of the process that the procedure was clean 
and did not lead to any incidents related to possible corruption, or – if this was not the case – what 
incidents occurred, how these were dealt with, and what the outcome was in the various cases”.31 
The available documentation does not inform about isolated or aggregated data on such reporting, 
although a text commenting on the application of IPs in Colombia by the organization that pro-
motes the methodology in that country points out that “it seems that there are conditions that in-
hibit the participants to use the scenario created by the Pact to report doubts about the behaviour of 
other participants. In general, they are more willing to point out the risks of corruption before the 
adjudication [of the contract] than after”.32 This seems to be the same situation whereby “several 
high-tech firms […] have an agreement [!] about not providing information on each other for fear 
that this could harm their access to the market”;33 and, again: “Most of those [participants in IPs] 
interviewed [in Colombia] said they would not denounce a competitor because it would hurt their 
commercial relations.”34 
As for the public official’s side, the “Elements” posit 
2)  An undertaking by the principal (the contracting State institution) that its functionaries will not take or 
extort bribes, with “appropriate disciplinary or criminal sanctions in case of violation”. 
But how can a responsible person (the head of the State office in question) sign anything on behalf 
of third parties (the officials belonging to that office) stating that these will not take or extort 
bribes?35 Imagining that somebody would be as adventurous as to sign such a pledge, in the event 
of somebody being caught red-handed, whom will suffer the sanctions provided by the IP: The 
functionary, who did not sign anything, or the office head, who pledged wrongly? Furthermore, as 
the IP intends to encompass the whole duration of the contract, any public official or private sub-
contractor involved in following up the object’s execution would become subsumed. In a big pro-
ject, this can involve hundreds of persons. Pledging that third parties will not act according to any 
given set of criteria is so clearly devoid of practical consequences that one wonders whether the 
requirement (which, being a “core” element, is mandatory for the accord to constitute an IP) is 
meant to be only symbolic. 
A matter connected to enforceability is the use of arbitration in lieu of formal mechanisms to re-
solve matters arising from public procurement. The possibility of using private arbitration to solve 
disputes arising from public procurement (or, in general, any public matter) varies according to the 
                                                             
31   [TI 2002b] p. 7. 
32   www.transparenciacolombia.org.co/formacion_cambio/contruccion_cultura/2ncontrata_pub_trans.htm. 
33   [TI 2002b], p. 137. 
34   [Holsen et. al.2002], p. 8. 
35  Although the IPs (Colombian and Ecuatorian) about which it was possible to obtain information, all functionaries 
directly involved sign the pledge, and not only the highest authority. 
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environment. One of the reasons often mentioned to use arbitration is to circumvent the slowness 
of Justice. Another is avoiding Judiciary corruption. But why is it taken for granted that private 
arbitration, especially if institutionalised in a mined field as public procurement, is freer from cor-
ruption? There is no reason to believe that the pressures operating upon private arbitration are any 
different than those operating upon the Judiciary. As for the more rapid resolution of conflicts arbi-
tration is assumed to provide, it must be balanced by the possibility of private parties deciding con-
trary to the public interest. In fact, there are countries where recourse to private arbitration is not 
allowed to resolve matters involving the public interest in general.36 
We can ask the question about control mechanisms from a different, more direct, perspective. As-
sessing the probability we are examining is in fact an empirical question, which can only be an-
swered by recourse to empirical data. Namely, how many IP-governed processes were shown to be 
corrupted, and how the statistics compare with non-IP-governed tenders? In Colombia, the organi-
zation responsible for conducting IPs reports that 51 tenders were subsumed to IPs between 1999 
and 2000. Of these, it is informed that the sponsoring organization withdrew from 11. In all cases, 
the reasons for withdrawal were connected to disagreements about the conditions surrounding the 
procedures, although no specifics are provided.37 No data is given on whether or not allegations of 
corruption came up during the remaining 40 instances.38 
Our quest for empirical data is of course a tongue-in-cheek question. There are no reliable data on 
corrupted ordinary procurement (a common observation is that corrupted tenders seldom reach the 
light of day, let alone the Judiciary), and the literature on IPs does not point to one single instantia-
tion of an IP that turned out to be corrupted. Of course, we reject as unjustified a contention along 
the lines that, since no allegations were voiced, then ipso facto IPs are impervious to corruption. 
Since there is no empirical evidence available to assess a hypothetical enhanced likelihood of be-
ing caught when bribing within an IP in comparison to the probability of bribing being discovered 
in ordinary procurement, one is forced to adopt the neutral stance of assuming that they are the 
same. As it was observed elsewhere, “[…] those with whom the problem was discussed recognize 
that the lack of incentives for, and protection of, ‘whistleblowers’ as a deficiency in the system 
which, in the medium-term, could erode the effectiveness of the Integrity Pact”.39 
Together with part a) above, relative to penalties, we conclude that the risk of bribing in IP-
governed tenders is only very fractionally enhanced, if at all. 
 
                                                             
36  As, for instance, is the case of Brazil. Law 9307/96, Art. 1, defines arbitration as exclusively applicable to resolve 
disputes involving disposable patrimonial rights. In Colombia, arbitration is regulated by Decree 2279/1989, modi-
fied and complemented by other legal dispositions. Art. 1 states that arbitration applies to “controversies suscepti-
ble to transaction arising between persons able to compromise”. Matters concerning public contracts seem not to be 
transactionable. In contrast, the Ecuatorian procurement law (272/2001, Art. 108) explicitly admits arbitration to 
resolve controversies. 
37   [Ospina 2001]. 
38  Effectively monitoring 51 procurement processes, some of them major, in the space of about one year, is an im-
pressive accomplishment. During the three following years, the organization monitored nine more tenders. 
39   [Holsen et. al. 2002], p. 8. 
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4.   The propensity to bribe 
As we saw in Section 1, an important component in the decision to win a contract with bribery is 
the environment’s vulnerability, translated as the likelihood that the conditions are manipulated to 
favour one participant over others. Given the heavy weight the IP methodology attributes to ethical 
influences in the decision-making process, we incorporated into this factor the hypothetical 
counter-weight of an “ethical” component. As before, we will examine those elements in turn. 
a. Objective conditions 
The ability of manipulating the conditions governing tenders corresponds to the most important 
element inducing the likelihood of a bribe being offered or extorted. Consequently, IPs that do not 
address the conditions renounce to interfere with the most crucial component. 
Some NGOs that promote IPs intend to provide a localised environment where participants are 
able to discuss the terms under which the process will be conducted. In principle, such terms 
would include from the conditions to participate (capital, liabilities, “prior experience” etc.), to the 
object’s definition, the criteria to define the winner and the terms of the contract. The relevance of 
the matter justifies quoting in length the views of the leader organization in the IP field: 
[...] the component that most contribute to impress transparency to public inversions and to generate trust 
among participants is carefully and equitably formulating the rules of the game and amply publicising them 
prior to the tender. It is consensual among both participants and public officials that it is in that phase that 
most frequently elements to direct the outcome are included. In order [for the NGO] to get protection against 
that it is necessary to maximally publicise the terms of the tender and of the ensuing contract, in such a way 
as, still as drafts, making them known and subjected to comments and criticism by experts, beneficiaries and 
interested parties. Their observations are the best guarantee as to the suggested process’ equitability, effi-
ciency and transparency, since the debate and the tensions between different interests that necessarily arise are 
the only possibility of earning confidence, arriving at an adequate point of equilibrium.40 
Although the stress is on trust and confidence earned by reaching consensus, rather than on the 
conditions themselves, the recognition as to the primary relevance of the latter, and as to the fact 
that participants are good judges of fairness, are clearly stated. Trust, being a subjective state of 
individuals, can only be directly ascertainable by asking the persons involved whether or not it de-
veloped. Indirectly, trust in a process can be partly evaluated by measuring the frequency of par-
ticipation of the subjects in repeated instantiations of the process – although for many participants 
in public markets, this is not really an option: Either they participate or change their line of busi-
ness. However, due to the relatively small number of IPs that were applied, and due to the diverse 
fields involved, such statistics, even if collected, would not allow for significant conclusions. 
The question about whether IPs lead to better competitive conditions can be answered by thorough 
examination of the conditions actual IPs impose and comparing them with the “normal”, non-IP 
conditions prevailing in the market. But if information on this is collected, it is not available. Ex-
amining which conditions were discussed was only possible in two cases from Ecuador41 and in 
one case found in a principal’s website in Colombia. In fact, one of the most surprising lacunae in 
                                                             
40   [TI-COL 2000] p. 46. 
41   See e.g. [CLD 2003]. 
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IP literature refers to the actual conditions governing tenders. Although striving for fairness is the 
pivotal centre of the whole methodology, the absence of discussions on how to identify unfairness 
in order to (try to) neutralise it is striking. 
To sum up, there is no reason to suppose that IPs do not favourably affect conditions governing 
tenders, diminishing the opportunities for entry barriers to be artificially erected. The process of 
discussing conditions should in principle help to identify and avoid artificial entry barriers, al-
though the lack of analytical information on IPs stands in the way of affirming it with sufficient 
conviction. 
b. Subjective conditions 
From the point of view of formal justification, the weaker component of IPs is its stronger claim, 
the “ethical” factor. It is weak because a public tender is an event governed by economic consid-
erations, and non-economic subjective inclinations do not have a place in economic rationality. 
According to an orthodox perspective, the “ethical” factor we introduced in the equation has no 
actual role in the decision-making process. However, just leaving matters at that would not do in 
the present circumstances, because the IP methodology is based on the assumption that there is a 
place for ethics in economic decision-making, and if economic modelling is unable to incorporate 
it, so much the worst for economic modelling. Additionally, simply sweeping aside ethical influ-
ences would be unfair to the effort IP practitioners apply to further the device. 
Asking whether ethical considerations apply to economic decision-making is, at bottom, an em-
pirical question. As it happens, indirect partial evidence that exposure to ethical discussions pro-
duce effects under some circumstances do exist. Thus, [James and Cohen 2003] reports on an ex-
periment conducted among economics students which indicated that those that attended an ethics 
module tended to collaborate more often in the prisoner’s dilemma game than those that did not 
attend the module.42 However, not only the prisoner’s dilemma is fundamentally dissimilar to the 
briber’s calculus43 but also an actual tender is not a classroom exercise. Evidence concerning IP-
governed procurement must be sought in actual IP-governed procurement events, controlling for 
variables that must also be assessed in non-IP-governed procurement. 
Then, are ethical commitments strong enough to outweigh the stimuli for bribery operating in pro-
curement? An IP introduces, or tries to introduce, environmental stimuli intended to make tenders 
more transparent and inclusive, in order to tranquillise participants that they will not be subjected 
to unfair surprises. Thus, part of the “defensive” stimuli to bribe is presumably diminished. This 
would go a long way, provided that the objectives of participating in tenders were limited to taking 
part of fair play competition. However, this is not so. The central justification for a firm to partici-
pate in a tender is actually winning the contract, and this furnishes aggressive stimuli to bribe and 
collude. The monetary benefits of bribery also furnish similarly aggressive stimuli for public offi-
cials to accept offers or to extort participants, moreover when it is remembered that agents receive 
no special compensation for being honest. 
                                                             
42   There are also numerous experiments showing how much people tend to cheat when given the opportunity. 
43   See the Annex. 
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As much as one can sympathise with the proposition that fair play is desirable by some of the firms 
and some of the public officials participating in procurement, accepting that the drive for fair play 
is generally stronger than the drive of firms to win contracts or of officials to abuse power in order 
to earn extra money would require too much from such sympathy. Our question can thus be inter-
preted as asking whether the ethical commitments of participants in IPs are as strong as to super-
sede the will to win the contract by any means.44 This question can only be answered by recourse to 
empirical evidence, which, again, is not available. If there is an effort of collecting, aggregating 
and analysing data on IPs in order to test the methodology’s premises, this is not reflected in the 
extant documents. 
The organization that promotes IPs in Italy does report that 45 firms were excluded from partici-
pating in tenders in a municipality (commune) as a direct consequence of the adoption of the IP 
methodology.45 However, the commune in question made IPs mandatory, and refusing to sign the 
IP automatically excludes the firm from participating. The commune itself reports (June 2003) that 
there were 211 exclusions involving 64 firms, resulting in 12 cases reported to the Judiciary au-
thorities. Nevertheless, according to the commune, this did not come about exclusively because of 
IPs, but as a result of a broader effort to clean up procurement, to which IPs are a part, perhaps 
even the predominant part, but not the whole.46 It is also to be observed that after the 1990’s “tan-
gentopoli” scandals, and following obligations stemming from European Union rules, the Italian 
procurement regulations were changed. According to [Bologna and Del Nord 2000], this brought 
about a profound transformation in public markets. 
A different type of evidence could be collected from the results of IP-governed procurement. Bet-
tering the State’s allocation of resources is high among the objectives of the IP methodology: “To 
enable governments to reduce the high cost and the distortionary impact of corruption in public 
procurement, privatisation or licensing”.47 There are many market-by-market comparative meas-
urements that can be made (“before” and “after”, as well as international) in order to collect evi-
dence on the relative openness of procurement environments. Among them the number of partici-
pants in similar bids; the concentration of the market (ratio of aggregated contract values vs. the 
number of firms winning such contracts); the average ratio of contract values and capital of win-
ning firms; unit prices resulting from the bid; etc. 
There are also more immediate evaluations, made case by case, that could provide indications 
about the effect an IP has on the tender in question. For instance, the comparison between condi-
tions in ordinary procurement in a certain environment and IP-governed instances could permit an 
independent party to qualitatively evaluate the presumable advantages of adopting IPs. Even grant-
                                                             
44   The exposition in [Ospina 2001] seems to lean in that direction. 
45   www.transparency.it/3_12.htm. 
46   www.comune.milano.it/webcity/comunicati.nsf/weball/AC88F78471873184C1256D04004EA672. In this case, as 
in others, actual civil society monitoring of the proceedings is not clear (CSO monitoring is in fact not essential, al-
though preferable. Cf. [TI 2002b] p. 14). 
47   [TI 2002b] p. 4. The public interest justification for using IPs is considerably more developed in the Italian version 
of the Pact (www.transparency.it/3_20.htm, “Premessa”). Not included in the English translation in [TI 2002b] pp. 
76ff. 
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ing that compiling and analysing data is resource-intensive and also depends on local availability 
of organised information, it would be expected that the official document supporting IPs would 
address the matter, which it does not. Reports on specific IPs likewise are silent about that. This 
does not preclude practitioners from referring to economic advantages: “[…] since May 1999, the 
organization followed 60 contracting processes […] and more than US$ 2.3 billion were pro-
tected”.48 The intention to state that the whole aggregate amount of the 60 contracts was “pro-
tected” (presumably from inefficiency and/or corruption) is unmistakable. 
On the other hand, as far as it was possible to check, this same organization is the only one that 
provides information in its website and elsewhere on number of participants, budgeted amounts, 
prices and identification of who won the contracts. As much as this is commendable when con-
trasted with other organizations, the data is presented in isolation, and the usefulness of the infor-
mation to assess the IP financial efficiency is limited for lack of comparative data. There is no in-
formation on unit prices achieved (when applicable), precluding the observer to compare outcomes 
with other markets. Similarly, an IP in Pakistan was heralded as allowing for an economy of about 
75% in consulting fees for the project of a water-treatment plant, such savings having been calcu-
lated by comparing the winning price of the tender (US$ 1.04 million) with the original estimation 
of US$ 4.2 million.49 The basis for the latter is not examined. In another source, it is contended that 
a similar previous contract resulted in a much higher price, but no specifics are provided.50 
Lack of organised evidence notwithstanding, there is no reason to suppose that IPs fail to deliver 
better outcomes. Provided that the playing field is relatively levelled and conditions to participate 
are made more open, then the economic outcomes should follow. It is an open question whether 
localised effects in individual tenders induce similar behaviours in the market in question. 
What the discussion so far indicates is that the lack of relevant data precludes stating that the ethi-
cal commitments by participants and public officials objectively counterbalance the stimuli for cor-
ruption that exist in procurement. Less opportunity for erecting entry barriers can be presumed in 
isolated cases. There is no sufficient data on actual outcomes of IP-driven processes that could be 
compared with ordinary tenders in order to evaluate the aggregated comparative worth of IPs. 
 
5.   A bit of an overstatement 
As pointed out before, IPs must be monitored. On completion, an IP’s proceedings must be de-
scribed in a report made public, and such report must include allegations of corruption, if any, and 
how they were dealt with: 
The ultimate result of such monitoring and supervision should be a statement at the end of the process that the 
procedure was clean and did not lead to any incidents related to possible corruption, or – if this was not the 
case – what incidents occurred, how these were dealt with, and what the outcome was in the various cases.51 
                                                             
48   www.transparenciacolombia.org.co/formacion_cambio/contruccion_cultura/2ncontrata_pub_trans.htm. 
49   [TI-Pakistan 2002], p. 80; also www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2002/2002.02.27.karachi.html. 
50   [TI 2002a], p. 8. 
51   [TI 2002b] p. 7. 
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Such formulation allows for only two possibilities: Corruption allegations having been reported; or 
the proceedings having been, literally, “clean”. Being “clean” is identified with the absence of 
bribery-related complaints from participants. This is unjustified. The absence of reporting on cer-
tain facts is not the same thing as the absence of the facts themselves. As quoted in p. 18, the pro-
moters of IPs are aware of that. Nevertheless, the drive to reaffirm the comparative cleanliness of 
IPs vis à vis ordinary procurement sometimes gains the upper hand, as e.g.: 
It is important to promote the fairly regular issuance of public statements by the signers of the integrity pact so 
that participants, in advancing from stage to stage in the contract process, may publicly confirm their satisfac-
tion with the probity of the process up to that point, based on the information available to them. Providing 
for such statements at every stage of the process makes it easier along the way to ascertain the exact 
moment at which any possible doubt may have begun to arise as to the cleanness of the process.52 
It is worth pointing out that confusing the absence of complaints about a process with the non-
existence of reasons for complaining is a device frequently used by governments to justify inac-
tion, and justly rebuked by critics. It is especially common in the area of procurement. Whereas the 
most one can conclude from the absence of complaints is that complaints were not filed, and never 
that the process was “clean”, much less beyond “any possible doubt”. 
From the point of view of an independent observer, why is it that protestations of cleanliness com-
ing from the various actors in an IP should in principle be more credible than the exact same alle-
gations coming from the exact same actors operating in non-IP procurement? 
It must be noted, however, that not all IP practitioners fall into the trap. Thus, the report issued 
from the Ecuatorian NGO that monitored an auction on Personal Communications System states 
that 
[…] Nevertheless, this document does not constitute a certification or confirmation that the process has been 
free of possible irregularities. […]53 
This essential disclaimer (which, if we take the IP prescription literally, prevents the initiative from 
being named an IP), or advice about the need to express it, cannot be found anywhere else, making 
this instance all the more noteworthy. 
Another type of logical slip sometimes appears when practitioners interpret the central commit-
ment of IPs, the honesty pledge. Thus, the objective of an IP is 
 […] to enable companies to abstain from bribing by providing assurances to them that their competitors will 
also refrain from bribing, and that government procurement agencies will undertake to prevent any form of 
corruption, including extortion and to follow transparent procedures.54 
The following example from a practising organization apparently corresponds (the original is in 
Spanish) to a direct translation of the above: 
[…] to allow companies to abstain from bribing by assuring them that their competitors will refrain from take 
recourse to bribery and that the contracting authorities will take measures to prevent any kind of corrup-
tion, including extortion, and will follow transparent processes.55 
                                                             
52   [Ospina 2001] p. 13. Here and in the sequel, CWA emphasis. 
53   [CLD 2003] p. 4. 
54   [Wiehen and Mohn 1998]. 




The Pact is intended to accomplish a number of objectives. It is meant to enable companies to abstain from 
bribing by providing assurances that their competitors won’t offer bribes and that government agencies will 
prevent corruption, including extortion by their officials.56 
The integrity pact would operate in the process of privatisation to ensure that no bribe was offered by the per-
son trying to buy the business and no bribe is asked for by the person in charge of selling it.57 
Expressions of confidence along the same lines can be found elsewhere. Thus, the IP: 
[…] is designed to safeguard public procurement from corruption. […]58 
[…] insures that all activities and decisions of public offices are transparent and that the projects/works are 
implemented, services are provided or taken, and goods/materials are supplied without giving or taking any 
kind of benefit, financial or otherwise. Justification of the decisions taken is provided without discrimination 
to all parties concerned or to any individual or institution/organization.59 
Commenting on public audiences sponsored by the then mayor of the Argentinean capital of Bue-
nos Aires around the construction of a subway branch, a primary source on IPs stated that the 
mayor was “[…] elected as the new President of Argentina – the people reward honesty!”60 
But how can one assure that bribery will not happen, that authorities will be able (or really willing) 
to take measures to prevent any kind of corruption, that participants will refrain from attempting 
bribery nevertheless, so safeguarding procurement from corruption? The use of this type of lan-
guage allows for secondary sources to go a step further:61 
[…] advocated the incorporation of Transparency International’s “Integrity Pact” with bid documents to 
make the procurement system corruption-free.62 
The Consejo de Promoción Turística de México and [an NGO] signed an Integrity Pact to guarantee the le-
gality, transparency and results [!] of seven tenders […].63 
[...] many corporations want to participate in [Integrity Pacts] because they allow for everybody to know that 
the corporation will not bribe anyone [...].64 
 
55  www.transparenciamexicana.org.mx/pactos.html. The text is illustrated with a diagram in which the contracting 
State entity is depicted as a green malice-eyed blob, while the private participants are represented as attaché case-
carrying executives. No allusion to IPs monitored by this organization can be found on its website. 
56   www.transparencypng.org.pg/newsl/issue2/ip.htm. 
57   www.postcourier.com.pg/20000303/focus.htm. 
58  www.transparency.org/building_coalitions/integrity_pact. 
59   www.transparency.org.pk/news/IP-Karachi.htm. 
60  [Wiehen 2000] p. 93, footnote 1. This was Fernando de la Rúa, who resigned from the Presidency in December 
2001 on the wake of an institutional crisis with corruption at its epicenter. 
61  It is to be noted, however, that the language is a little more cautious in other TI sources: “In such Pacts, all the 
players start on a level playing-field so that the risk of a bribe is greatly reduced”. [Pope/TI 2000], p. 144. Al-
though in other parts of this book one can find the same formulation extensively quoted previously.  
62  www.rediff.com/news/2001/aug/31arms.htm. 
63   www.infoanalisis.com.mx/boletincptm/numero61/new_page_1.htm. 
64  USA Under Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Otto Reich, according to a dispatch distributed by 
USIA, September 2002. 
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Why is it that primary sources tend to overstate the power of IPs? It will be recalled that a central 
feature, arguably the most important one, of IPs is a pledge by both participants and public offi-
cials not to enter into dishonest dealings (backed by special provisions as to disclosure, reporting, 
monitoring etc.). However, the pledge is a negative statement about private behaviours.65 It is fun-
damentally different from a positive pledge about public behaviour. In the latter case (“I will do 
such and such thing within such and such timeframe”), partial or total non-compliance is immedi-
ately verifiable. It suffices to show that any or all the clauses were not fulfilled: Such and such 
thing did not happen, and/or the timeframe was wrong. It would not be possible to plausibly say 
that the thing was done if it wasn’t, and conversely, it would be impossible to plausibly say that the 
thing was not done if it was.66 
In a negative oath about private behaviour (“I will not secretly do such”) the situation is not 
equivalent. Although it is possible to say that the thing was in fact done provided that sufficient 
evidence is presented, exactly because the act is private, the absence of evidence makes it impossi-
ble to ascertain that the thing was or was not done. Thus, if two persons agree among themselves 
to sign an honesty pledge within an IP and, at the same time, secretly agree that the pledge is just 
window-dressing for the benefit of a third party, the latter will only be able to check that it hap-
pened if evidence is presented. Whereas the absence of evidence will not authorise any conclusion 
whatsoever, and will not justify saying that the oath was not breached. Moreover, for someone who 
is willing to pay bribes to win contracts, it is not clear why honesty pledges and more open condi-
tions for competition would function as deterrents. After all, irrespective of the legal environment, 
bribery is not an accepted behaviour, and furthermore it is often a crime. If someone is willing to 
commit a crime, then breaking one’s word by signing an honesty pledge and not abiding by it is a 
minor inconvenience. This is the central credibility problem of the IP honesty pledge: Non-
compliance remains secret, and therefore the pledge has no meaning. Further, the recommendation 
stated in [TI 2002b], that an IP’s report states that the process was “clean” if no cases of suspected 
bribery were registered, is plainly hazardous. 
A still additional matter regarding overstatements is the contention that IPs 
[…] can and should be applied to the full range of activities concerning a particular investment, sale, license 
or concession: […] extending to the implementation of the main activity (execution of the construction or 
supply contract, especially the compliance with all the contract specifications agreed and all change and varia-
tion orders); indeed, for projects such as big dams or toxic plants (such as nuclear power plants), the protec-
tion by the IP should continue until the decommissioning and the disposal of the project assets.67 
It is to be recalled that, preferably, an IP should be monitored by a civil society organization, so 
that such a CSO would have to be able to do all this over the entire execution of the contract. Thus, 
in a sizable contract, it would have to amass sufficient resources to hire extensive technical exper-
tise, acquire or rent equipment and provide for a host of ancillary details during dilated periods of 
                                                             
65   The argument here expands [CWA 2001a]. 
66   This is of course a simplification. There might be debate on whether or not something done in fact corresponds to a 
previous pledge. However, the essential remains, namely, something was done or not done and evidence is avail-
able for independent perusal. 
67   [TI 2002b] p. 9. This is also stated as one of the “main characteristics” of IPs, cf. p. 4 above. 
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time. This is implausible. On the other hand, as many corruption mechanisms operate during the 
contract’s execution (such as the official deliberately over-specifying expensive components and 
the contractor under-performing the corresponding execution), and as these are often linked to pe-
culiarities and/or omissions in the tender and/or the contract itself, everything stemming from the 
law and the (in)competence of the authorities’ oversight, the inability to monitor the execution 
must pose a dilemma for IP practitioners. 
 
6.   Information lag 
A maximum of transparency all along the various steps leading to the Contract and throughout its implemen-
tation is the basis of the successful design, set-up and implementation of an IP. Such transparency, in turn, 
calls for extensive and easy public access to all the relevant information including design [… etc.]. It is highly 
desirable that there be a forum in which representatives of civil society can discuss the official steps taken on 
the context of the Contract. At the present time, the Internet provides a near ideal platform. […] 
However, to monitor systematically and in detail the above processes in the context of an IP, civil society [!] 
may delegate these activities to entities professionally equipped to do this, e.g. an […] Independent Private 
Sector Inspector General, a suitable government office with no involvement whatsoever in the supervised 
procedures, a Transparency International Chapter, or another NGO. In each case the monitoring and supervi-
sion procedures should be specified […].68 
Airing information, reporting, making otherwise hidden or difficult to obtain data available for 
public perusal, would be essential features of any initiative seeking more transparency in any field. 
Many corruption schemes in procurement feed on hiding information that should be public. Ac-
cordingly, the IP methodology stresses the point. Likewise, the CSOs involved in IPs must report 
and make their processes transparent. In principle, this could also help to show that the CSOs ad-
dress their own limitations and are open to criticism. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to practice, IP-promoting NGOs almost totally fail to fulfil the obliga-
tion of reporting on the IPs they monitor. An effort was made by the author to find reports for the 
many IPs the organizations mentioned in [TI 2002b] promoted or were promoting at the time of 
this writing. The survey included not only the websites of the organizations themselves, but also a 
good number of the principals’ and of the firms that won the respective contracts (not all, though). 
Reports on IPs were almost totally absent. The partial exceptions were two: the Argentinean NGO, 
which summarily reported on one of the two initiatives it promoted. Two full reports from the Ec-
uatorian NGO that followed auctions on Personal Communications Systems and on a Wireless Lo-
cal Loop, found in the principal’s website, which give full information on the procedures.69 
The Colombian NGO that is leader in the field publishes a summary of IPs, but no reports.70 One 
cannot eliminate the possibility that in this case, as in others, reports do exist but the various or-
ganizations failed to update the relevant information. The end result is the same. In fact, docu-
ments relative to an auction for a PCS system in Colombia, published under the responsibility of 
                                                             
68   [TI 2002b] pp. 7f. 
69   See p. 24. www.conatel.gov.ec/espanol/subasta/subastas.htm. 
70   On this, see p. 23. 
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the principal and not of the NGO, were found in a server of that country’s Communications Minis-
try, but they are not easily accessible to ordinary visitors. 
Further, the leader NGO states that one of its objectives to participate in IPs is “To produce em-
pirical information on the risk map of corruption about […] public resources inversions, by means 
of analysing the common elements and particularities of the different tenders it monitors”.71 The 
organization in question issues a summary report on the IP methodology as applied in Colombia.72 
The substance of the report is giving advice on how to build IPs, together with general remarks on 
opacity. Besides summary numbers, no statistics or detailed analyses are provided. If detailed and 
thorough reporting both on particular IPs and on aggregated collected information is not extant, 
then it becomes difficult to understand how is it that the lessons learned can be spread in the envi-
ronment and thus help to disseminate a culture leading to better practices and able to induce 
changes in the institutional framework. 
Within a full-fledged IP, the participants discuss rules and conditions, or so states the doctrine. 
Knowledge about how to do that and what aspects to address is absorbed along the time by all con-
cerned, but the NGOs that sponsor IPs are in a privileged position, because they participate in a 
higher number of them. If they fail to adequately share their knowledge, then their experience be-
comes encapsulated and quasi-proprietary, and part of the justification for installing IPs is effec-
tively voided. 
 
7.   A matter of strategy 
Running underneath the lawfulness and legal sensibleness of IPs there is a more fundamental ques-
tion, namely, whether IPs contribute to the betterment of a country’s procurement environment. Or, 
to put it in other words, whether it is best to apply one’s efforts to promote IPs or to seek changes 
in the institutional environment. This is in reality the most fundamental question for those who 
strive to curb corruption. As one practitioner in Ecuador puts it, 
[The organization] mainly focus on the structural changes of the conditions that allow for and promote corrupt 
activities in public acquisitions. The opportunity to implement IPs would help to create a favourable environ-
ment for the promotion of structural reforms in the country’s public acquisition system.73 
By definition, IPs are centred on individual tenders. Series of individual IPs are hoped to help in-
duce gradual changes in the environment. As we have seen, practitioners are not of a single mind 
about whether or not those changes should aim at the legal environment. The most successful pro-
moter consistently expresses that IPs are directed to cultural values and not institutional reform, 
and goes as far as opposing the institutionalisation of IP particularities (see footnote 21).74 On the 
other hand, the institutionalisation of IPs, as in some Italian communes and Seoul (South Korea), is 
                                                             
71   [TI-LAC 2001], “Pactos de integridad”. See note 94. 
72   [TI-COL 2000]. 
73   [CLD 2003] p. 8. 
74  But not as far as rebuking the adoption of IPs as a government’s preferential policy (Colombian Presidential Direc-
tive number 9, December 29, 1999), or the choice of the organization as official caretaker of telecommunication 
tenders (Law 555/2000, Art. 5, paragraph – alas, found unconstitutional by that country’s Supreme Court). 
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welcomed by proponents. IPs are suggested by the World Commission on Dams as a “Strategic 
priority” to stimulate compliance to contracts.75 
Given the fact that IPs intend to establish a healthier environment to conduct procurement, it 
stands to reason that they primarily aim at unhealthy environments, that is, situations where the 
rules governing procurement and the apparatus for enforcement are shaky, incomplete, confusing 
etc. Much of a complete IP deals with establishing more open conditions for participating and rules 
of procedure applicable to all phases of the process. Whereas a reasonably healthy environment 
would have all this essentially dealt with in the legislation, in the administrative regulations and in 
the commercial practices. Thus, according to a secondary source, “Integrity pacts are of particular 
use in situations where regulatory systems and institutional capacity are weak, but they have uni-
versal application”.76 It also makes sense to say that in unhealthy situations, anything working 
along the direction of enhancing transparency, equity, accountability and striving for better prac-
tices is to be welcomed, and IPs should not be judged differently in that regard. Moreover, in such 
situations, if the spirit of IPs finds a way to become included in the formal framework, so much the 
better. This is apparently the way things went in Seoul and in the Italian communes mentioned 
above. Conversely, however, a healthier environment, especially concerning the formal rules, 
would not seem to need as much “external” complementation. In that regard, it is useful to com-
pare governance indicators for some countries where IPs were/are practiced and/or are being initi-
ated. The following graphs depict the “Government Effectiveness” (left) and “Rule of law” (right) 
indicators of [KKM, 2003] for a number of countries and regions.77 
                                                             
75   [WCD 2000] p. 278. 
76   Ibid. p. 305. 
77   [KKM 2003]. See there the meaning of these and other governance indicators. 
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Countries where the transparency principles behind IPs were or are being introduced in local rules, 
as Italy and Korea (and perhaps some Mexican public offices, but this is not clear)78 fare better 
than other countries, where IPs are promoted case-by-case. Nevertheless, the preferential adequacy 
of IPs to weaker institutional environments is contested by the representative of the organization 
that spearheads their use. Thus, 
An adequate legal framework already exists in Colombia [to impose] efficient, equitable, and transparent pub-
lic-resource contracting processes. Colombia’s Contracting Law – namely, Law 80 of 1993, the central axis of 
all contracting-related legislation in the country – is sufficient, clear, flexible, and complete and is widely 
known by all the parties involved in public contracting. […]79 
A similar claim by the same author, registered elsewhere, was that among the strengths of the Co-
lombian environment one could find: “Proper legal framework; Constitutional guarantees for citi-
zenry control; Sufficient public institutionality; Control agencies strengthening process; Tradition 
of public policies and programs against corruption; Skilled and capable human resource in central 
administration; Transparent contracting experience”.80 However, contrary to this, a commentator 
observed that 
[…] some sections of [Ospina 2001] mention a series of problems within the legal system, such as the following: Legal 
norms do not assure that tenders are clear, fair, viable and transparent; The existence of legal mechanisms that allow for 
“direct (or emergency) contracting” […]; There is little or no knowledge of tenders and of the “rules of the game” appli-
cable to public procurement processes, and that the practice – we presume – is not properly regulated by the law; That 
subjective criteria are applied in the evaluation of bids; or, that the draft of the contract is not previously and publicly dis-
cussed.81 
Ascertaining whether or not a country’s legal environment is adequate – thus deciding which of the 
conflicting evaluations is more accurate, and therefore accepting or not either author’s contentions 
– requires examining that country’s institutional en-
vironment. This was in fact done in early 2002 by 
the organization the first author represents, within 
an initiative aimed at evaluating the vulnerabilities 
of the procurement environments of a number of 
Latin American countries. The methodology was 
based on defining possible entry barrier-erecting 
opportunities and verifying whether or not the envi-
ronments allowed for them to be exercised.82 The 
result was that the Colombian environment was di-





















                                                             
78   See footnote 5. 
79   [Ospina 2001] p. 6. 
80   www.respondanet.com/english/anti_corruption/reports/presentation_materials/more/OSPINA-SPAN.ppt. Available 
also in English. Also in [TI-COL 2000], p. 12. 
81   [Merino 2001] p. 6. 
82  A weakness of the procedure was that country assessments did not necessarily obey to a standard methodology and 
that they were not subjected to independent counter-check. 
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ria,83 thus confirming the second author’s earlier observation. The graph depicts a “naïve” vulner-
ability index aggregating risks identified in the countries subjected to the exercise and excluding 
controversial issues (i.e., two peculiarities about which there was no consensus on whether their 
presence meant a vulnerability or not); maximum vulnerability is 1, and minimum 0. (In the case 
of Costa Rica, the information is limited to road construction and maintenance.)84 
Elsewhere it was observed that in Colombia 
The almost exclusive emphasis on reforms of the procurement legal framework would appear to be con-
demned to failure as far as that emphasis does not effectively address the identification and punishment of 
corrupt practices among public officials and corporations, and does not allow for opening up competition.85 
It is to be observed, though, that, curiously, this perspective considers that “opening up competi-
tion” does not depend on the legal framework, whereas one of the central points of regulating pro-
curement, perhaps the central one, should be promoting competition by way of diminishing the op-
portunities for agents erecting entry barriers for participants. Legal reforms that fail to target that 
goal are indeed doomed to failure.86 
Of course, there is no inherent tension between, on the one hand, striving to change the institu-
tional background and tightening up enforcement, and on the other hand promoting isolated initia-
tives as IPs. But a tension may develop if the weight of institutional changes is negated or down-
played. After all, if we take for granted that legal provisions are not sufficient to guarantee fair 
dealings in procurement (as in anything else), this is not to say that they are not necessary. Deny-
ing, even if not in so many words, the necessity of a healthy legal framework is very dangerous, as 
such a position in effect stimulates disbelief in the rule of law and, at the very least, is self-
defective: 
If in fact the solution to the problems affecting public procurement cannot concentrate solely in the design of 
a new legal framework or in a legal reform, it is indisputable that an inadequate judicial framework not only 
contributes to corruption, […] but also makes the application of the “integrity pacts” impossible.87 
More importantly, in the absence of facts, numbers and publicising of IP inner workings (see be-
low), it becomes more difficult to see how their possible impact on the general procurement envi-
ronment could be exercised. After all, the crushing majority of financial State-private interactions 
arising from procurement (and the diseconomies thereof) is not associated with gigantic projects, 
privatisations, licensing and other events confronting transnational corporations, but from thou-
sands of instantiations of all sizes happening continuously along the year. What are the chances of 
a few isolated IPs influencing them? 
                                                             
83   See  www.transparency.org/tilac/trabajo_en_red/contrataciones/dnld/riesgos_colombia.pdf. See also [CWA/TI-
LAC et. al. 2002] for the aggregated report, including all participating countries. 
84   [CWA/TI-LAC et. al. 2002]. 
85  [World Bank 2002]. Some particularities of Colombian Law 80 of 1993 were changed since, the last time in Sep-
tember 2002 (Presidential decree 2170). 
86  See also the chapters on procurement in [TI-LAC 1996] and [TBrasil 2002] for expositions of procurement regula-
tions according to the perspective of market competition. 
87   [Merino 2001], p. 7. 
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Directing a civil society organization’s main efforts (not to mention the State’s) to particular in-
stantiations of a general procedure is an important strategic decision in view of the scarcity of re-
sources. Such a decision might preclude giving due attention to the general conditions. 
IP-promoting texts frequently mention the development of trust, and it is expected that such trust 
should come from trusting the virtues of the IP itself, without recourse – even if only in a support-
ing role – to data. For instance, “The process of implementing each Integrity Pact is an invitation to 
a voluntary cultural change”. Among the objectives themselves of IPs there is “Positioning and 
winning credibility among private firms about the IP’s effectiveness as an instrument to generate 
confidence in processes and to prevent corruption acts”.88 
The stress on cultural change was commented in an internal TI study: 
The importance of “cultural changes”, whereby ethical considerations would replace legal compulsion as the 
reason for honest behaviour by public officials and private contractors, is mentioned a number of times in the 
Colombia case studies. Further analysis and discussion is needed of the role of ethics and voluntarism, as op-
posed to legal compulsion, in strengthening public sector procurement processes. Can motivation based on 
ethics be encouraged, while at the same time motivation based on law and judicial enforcement is relied upon 
to obtain the desired behaviour from all participants?  Or could it be that, in at least some country situations, 
the problems in the legal system are so great that this is not really an effective alternative?89 
 
 
8.  Who minds the minders? 
Firms competing in markets do not discriminate between the terrains where they compete. They try 
to gain advantages over their competitors everywhere. The pervasiveness of pressures and counter-
pressures of all kinds, exercised by private interests, has been recognised as a central feature – and 
a central problem – in the modern State, especially in what regards corruption. Integrity Pacts, be-
ing just another terrain where firms compete, should not be looked at as privileged in what con-
cerns those movements and counter-movements. 
One particular preoccupation an independent party might justly formulate regards the possible ac-
tion of cartels in IPs. It was previously observed that in public procurement there exists a collabo-
rative economic stimulus for firms to fix prices, erect barriers to new entrants in the market and 
distribute contracts amongst members.90 The common characteristic binding such cartels depends 
on a number of factors, the more usual being geographical (contractors, suppliers of goods), the-
matic (IT systems, telecommunications etc.) and client-specific (contractors purportedly specialis-
ing in building schools, or health care centres etc.). There are very strong economic stimuli for es-
                                                             
88   www.transparenciacolombia.org.co/formacion_cambio/contruccion_cultura/2ncontrata_pub_trans.htm. 
89   [Holsen et. al. 2002], p. 6. 
90  It suffices to quote Adam Smith: “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diver-
sion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or some contrivance to raise prices” (The Wealth 
of Nations, Book 1, Chapter X, Part 2). Modern investigation on cartels heavily rely on the tensions between com-
petitive and collaborative strategies. 
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tablished providers to stabilise the supply conditions and so beat the law of diminishing returns.91 
This cannot happen without public officials’ knowing and abetting. Suppliers also try to stimulate 
the demand side, and in public markets they notoriously do so by pressuring and colluding with 
high-level policy-makers to invent expenditures (e.g. by financing political campaigns). Of course, 
the expedient is not limited to cartels. 
Given a cartel, and given an institution that adopts IPs, at least in principle there would be no im-
pediment for it to attempt “capturing” the IP procedure. The IP documentation partly recognises 
the danger of cartels defining artificially high prices in one particular tender, although not as a 
danger of capture of the IP procedure itself.92 
Whoever is invited to adopt the IP methodology may ask – and if they are experienced in procure-
ment they will certainly ask – what compensatory measures, if any, IPs offer to the problem of car-
tels. Asking the question is not the same thing as suggesting that there exists a fast and easy solu-
tion. Nevertheless, there are some relatively simple procedures that could be undertaken to at least 
address the worry. Listing all companies operating in a given market together with their capitals 
and liabilities (registers of suppliers are becoming increasingly common, although not everywhere) 
goes a long way to exhibit market distribution and concentration; even in the absence of the for-
mer, listing who win contracts (not only IP-related) shows preferences, if any, that might operate. 
Evidence as to the presence of “merry-go-round” methods can be sought by analysing medium-
term patterns of contract adjudication. Lastly, one would naturally surmise that in order to be able 
to compare the performance of IPs with ordinary procurement, unit prices would be collected and 
systematised.93 When the IP methodology is adopted by entire State organizations, it would be 
natural to expect that the same drive towards transparency would prompt initiatives to open up the 
structural features of suppliers’ markets, even if only to build performance indicators. Likewise, it 
would be expected that the promoters of IPs did the same.94 
Economic globalisation and the surge of privatisations in many third-world and transition (ex-
socialist Eastern European) countries raise the matter of cartels and trusts operating globally and 
taking advantage of the fragility of Integrity Pacts. Global and regional markets are just markets, 
albeit big. The lack of international regulations over tenders in those markets, together with the 
absence of controls and the incipient character of enforcement mechanisms (such as e.g. the OECD 
convention against transnational bribery, the Organization of Inter-American States anti-corruption 
convention and the new United Nations convention) should ring alarms. Take, for instance, auc-
tions for privatisations, especially in cross-nationally integrated fields as e.g. telecommunications, 
or energy. There is no reason to disregard the possibility of players in that field colluding to divide 
regional markets and exclude other entrants: firm A colludes with firm B in order to secure market 
                                                             
91   In a perfect market, competition forces prices down, making profits tend to zero. 
92   [TI 2002b] p. 136. 
93  Of course, directly comparing unit prices is only possible within a given market. In order to perform cross-market 
comparisons, it is necessary to introduce environmental factors to reduce essentials to a common ground. 
94  In [TI-COL 2000] p. 43 the Colombian NGO that is leader in IPs states that it reached an agreement with the 
School of Administration of the Universidad de los Andes to do just that. There is no further mention to such ac-
tivities and the School’s website does not mention them. 
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X to A and market Y to B, excluding firm C in both cases. The mutual benefit is partitioning the 
regional market among them. Integrity Pacts operating under such conditions would make practi-
tioners innocent participants in high-powered transnational collusion.95 
The NGO role as the monitoring instance also rises a number of questions. The first and most ob-
vious is where their legitimacy comes from. It does not suffice simply to write down that 
[…] to monitor systematically and in detail [proceedings] in the context of an IP, civil society may delegate 
these activities to […] a Transparency International Chapter, or another NGO. […]96 
What is “civil society” here? If not by voting, how is it exactly that civil society “delegates” any-
thing to an NGO? This is of course a standing question regarding the role and accountability of 
NGOs in general, but in this case there is direct involvement of public money, in some cases in 
huge amounts. Dealing with public money is a public matter, so that choosing a particular NGO to 
act as oversight likewise is, or should be, a public matter. In addition, it is to be observed that the 
organization that promotes IPs in Colombia is paid by the government to do it.97 It is worth men-
tioning that specifying one particular NGO to exercise civil society oversight in bulk was at-
tempted in Colombia. Law 555/2000, which regulates concessions for Personal Communications 
Services, established in its Article 5, paragraph, that: 
Both in the procurement and the adjudication of contracts for concession of licenses to operate PCS there will 
be intervention by Transparency International, directly or through its branch Transparencia Colombia, and/or 
a non-government organization of recognised international prestige, dedicated to the fight against corruption, 
with the aim of safeguarding the principles of equal opportunity, democratic access, transparency, non-
discriminatory dealings and, in general, of avoiding any form of corruption. 
However, in October 2002, the Colombian Constitutional Court found (sentence C-887-02): 
NON-EXEQUIBLE the paragraph of Article 5 of Law 555/2000, for violating the right to equality [derecho 
de la igualdad], since it ignores the generality principle when it specifically designates a non-government or-
ganization and because there exist internal oversight and citizen participation mechanisms that may intervene 
in the process of procurement and adjudication of contracts for PCS concessions.98 
Evidently, money is needed in order to monitor anything. An NGO doing it needs to finance its 
activities. But the appropriateness of getting the financing from the State entity itself that is being 
monitored raises questions. Although one fully realises that it is a difficult decision for an NGO to 
turn down financing from a government to monitor procurement, and one can appreciate the di-
lemma posed, it would seem that the circumstances plant at least the seed of a conflict of interest. 
Notice that this is not the same situation as in the case of an NGO that is paid by the State to pro-
vide a service. In an IP, the NGO is an integral part of the proceedings and is supposed to vouch 
                                                             
95  It is interesting to observe that during the discussions currently being held within the World Trade Organization 
around a possible agreement on transparency in public procurement, an opinion was expressed as to “any eventual 
agreement on transparency in government procurement should be limited in scope to procurement of goods only 
and should not include procurement of services or any combination of goods and services”. See [WTO 2003], para. 
12. 
96   [TI 2002b] pp. 7f. 
97  [TI-LAC 2001], “Pactos de integridad”. The information was not provided at the organization’s website at the time 
of this writing. 
98   There is no mention to the ruling at the NGO’s website. 
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for the tender’s “cleanliness”. The main author on IPs considers such relationship possible only in 
developed countries (why is it that rich countries are singularised is not explained), and even then 
with reservations: 
In more developed countries, the cost of TI-NC exercising this function may have to be covered, at least in 
part, by the government although one must take extreme care that reliance on government funding will not 
undermine or jeopardize the critical element of independence.99 
In the general case, if an NGO is dedicated to systematically participate in procurement, then it be-
comes the target of questions regarding the transparency of its own dealings. Saying this by no 
means should be construed as to insinuate that there are suspicions of collusion between NGOs 
and agents/participants. However, as trying to achieve the maximum possible transparency in pro-
curement is, after all, what ultimately justifies the whole IP methodology, it follows that the exact 
same concerns automatically affect all aspects of NGO participation. At the very least, the dictum 
about the wife of Caesar applies. There is no reason to take for granted that NGOs are impervious 
to failure.100 
Contrary to this, it appears that the IP theorists do think that private sector entities and civil society 
organizations are endowed with special prerogatives vis à vis government organizations. Thus, it is 
stated that monitoring the procedures within an IP should be done by entities such as an Independ-
ent Private Sector Inspector General or NGOs, but when it comes to State institutions, the special 
provision is specified that they must have “no involvement whatsoever in the supervised proce-
dures”,101 which is of course absolutely sensible (and required for State oversight organisms in any 
reasonably healthy environment). However, why is it that, in contrast, an NGO with total “in-
volvement in the procedures” is considered acceptable to monitor the very same procedures it 
sponsored in the first place? A concern along the same general lines, expressed under a different 
but compatible perspective, was expressed elsewhere: 
The broad acceptance and increasing institutionalisation of an instrument may not be without risks […]. One 
case worth examination concerns integrity pacts in Colombia. This instrument is now well established and 
[…] the [NGO] is being reimbursed for its contribution. However, once an instrument becomes well estab-
lished, there may be a case for having it implemented by a properly independent office […]. This might avoid 
the otherwise possible “bureaucratisation” [of the NGO].102 
Further, differently from a government, which in some cases is practically expected to be accused 
of misusing public money, an NGO that finds its name linked to a case of corruption, even if by 
well-intentioned association, would find itself in an untenable position – notably if it followed the 
IP methodology recipe and vouched for the proceedings’ cleanliness. In any other circumstance, 
the potential loss of prestige following a possible discovery of errors or omissions would be 
                                                             
99   [Wiehen 2000] p. 89. 
100 The recent (June 2003) launch of an organization to monitor NGOs (NGO Watch, www.ngowatch.org) by two 
American institutions (the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and the Federalist Society for 
Law and Public Policy Studies) should not be heralded as a progress, due to its clear ideological objectives. It is a 
pity that an initiative aiming at achieving more accountability from NGOs did not come from other, non-partisan, 
organizations that could have taken the lead in this field. 
101  [TI 2002b], p. 7. 
102 [Holsen et. al. 2002], p. 6. 
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enough to identify a conflict of interest. Even in the absence of financial dependence of the NGO 
to the government, becoming intimately involved with what is in final analysis a duty of the State 
prompts the speculation that the incumbent NGO-government-private sector relationship should 
be, itself, submitted to independent monitoring. It is easy to see that this new situation would in 
turn need monitoring, entailing an infinite regress. 
At the bottom of the problem is the role envisaged for civil society oversight. As we have seen, 
although there is no formal environmental limitation to the IP applicability, the soil for its growth 
seems to be the more fertile the more intense the perception is that the State does not function very 
well. On p. 14 it was commented that, language notwithstanding, IPs cannot really intend to oper-
ate outside the law. In point of fact, such stance is perhaps unwarranted. The leader organization 
that practices IPs contends103 that within an IP, participants “accept common regulating systems 
linked to rewards [?] and penalties above those [por encima de] defined by law”. The empirical 
question as to whether there were attempts to apply such penalties “above the law” (or even “in 
addition to the law”, if this is what was meant) to somebody is unanswerable, as there is no report-
ing of non-compliance of parties to any IP. 
On a more fundamental plane, a civil society organization stimulating people to work “above the 
law” and announcing its willingness to do so on the basis of its militants’ own beliefs raises the 
question as to why everybody else might not feel entitled to the same. Why is it that one particular 
set of beliefs has the right to be arbitrarily adopted and others not? The whole apparatus of repre-
sentative democracy and the interplay of the institutional powers are meant to resolve the matter 
via suffrage, and by subsuming disputes to Justice. If these do not work very well, then, if one 
sticks to representative democracy, one is bound to operate within the confines of the institutional 
mechanisms, more so when striving to change them. Whereas the result of ad hoc groups operating 
in society independently of the rule of law inevitably backfires, leading to the rule of the strongest. 
 
9.   By way of conclusion 
We recall the reasoning we interpret behind the Integrity Pact idea: 
1.  Given that corruption in public procurement raises transaction costs, hampers technological 
evolution and brings other systemic diseconomies, it is detrimental to the interests of private 
firms. 
While it is reasonably clear that this is true if the object is the public interest (entire markets), 
it’s particularisation to individual firms is not. The private sector vigorously combat whatever 
environmental factor it considers harmful to its interests, so prima facie if bribery were viewed 
as so harmful to individual private firms as implied, they would not initiate bribery as often as 
they effectively do. From a strictly actuarial point of view, the supposition also takes for 
granted that the cost of bribery affects the firms themselves – while it is not reasonable to dis-
                                                             
103    [Ospina 2001] p. 22. Also in www.respondanet.com/english/anti_corruption/reports/presentation_materials/mo-
re/OSPINA-SPAN.ppt. 
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regard that the cost of bribery is incorporated into the price the State pays for contracts. Oth-
erwise, firms would consistently, predictably and irrationally lose money. 
2.  Individual firms cannot effectively avoid bribing because they fear that other firms will bribe 
to win contracts. 
This premise seems to be reasonable, although not exactly as formulated. There is no reason to 
imagine that firms (or rather their executives) want to avoid bribery, as a value. Firms include 
in their calculations whatever cost factors they perceive, and if bribery is a part of a certain 
market, then this just brings another cost factor into the equation. Nevertheless, bribery does 
tend to encompass all participants, and not just a few. 
3.  As bribery introduces information asymmetry amongst participants, one way to reduce it is by 
sharing subjective information about values. 
This confuses values with information. “Information” is a concept restricted to data ascertain-
able by third parties. It does not include privately held intentions, which are not testable. 
4.  The participatory process of discussing and sharing values stimulates non-bribery collabora-
tion among participants, while preserving business competition. 
This assumption can only be judged empirically. Nevertheless, it is in turn based on the as-
sumption that firms are willing to collaborate in order to compete better. However, observed 
commercial practices do not seem to support the view that firms collaborate in order to perfect 
competition. Instead, they try to get the upper hand over competitors, stopping only under the 
external force of opposing strategies, regulations and enforcement. Under these constraints, 
they explore all avenues at their disposal to beat their opponents. Always from the perspective 
of individual firms, bribery is not intrinsically different from other competitive factors. 
A possible origin for the reasoning behind Integrity Pacts is the view that corruption is in essence a 
moral problem. As by definition moral questions refer to individuals, thus the emphasis on self-
perfecting, beliefs, the development of trust etc., and thus playing down the regulatory conditions. 
However, from the perspective of a society’s economic efficiency, the latter is what matters; 
whether or not individuals vocally profess this or that particular moral code is irrelevant.  
It is interesting to observe that depicting corruption as a moral issue badly backfires. The following 
is an extract of discussions held in the World Trade Organization in February 2003 about an in-
tended multilateral agreement on transparency in public procurement. A contribution by the repre-
sentative of the European Community on “Positive Effects of Transparency in Government Pro-
curement and Its Implementation” was discussed. On being criticised by various country represen-
tatives for having mentioned corruption in the document, the EU representative recouped and 
stated that because corruption is “a moral issue”, it does not belong to the domain of the WTO: 
With regard to the issue of the relationship between transparency in government and the reduction of corrup-
tion, the view was expressed that corruption existed in all countries, even notwithstanding the application of 
transparency rules. Nevertheless, transparency rules enhanced the ability of countries to combat this problem. 
In response, the point was made [by the EU representative] that, while reducing corruption was a laudable ob-
jective for all national governments, it should not be a principal objective, nor should it be built into any pos-
sible agreement on transparency in government procurement. This was a moral issue, and that moral, social 
and similar kinds of issues were not the domain of the WTO. Rather, such issues should be addressed by each 
Member in accordance with its own respective legislation. It was also questioned how a multilateral agree-
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ment could assist Members in combating such practices. In response, it was noted that the rationale underly-
ing a future agreement on transparency in government procurement would not be to reduce corruption. Nor 
would a future multilateral agreement contain specific provisions on corruption. Rather, the reduction of cor-
ruption would be a side-effect of the agreement.104 
 
As observed previously, trying to directly insert moral considerations into economic reasoning is 
not feasible due to the private character of values and to the unsolvable problem of ascertaining 
whether or not one’s professed values actually projects onto one’s non-observable behaviour – as 
is the case of bribery. Mutatis mutandis, the same problem affects trust. In an interesting discussion 
on honesty in negotiation centred on the role of deception in business, [Cramton and Dees 1993] 
establish the link between trust and reputation, show why the development of trust is affected by 
faulty information and suggest a number of mechanisms to depersonalise the matter. Of course, 
mechanisms are of the essence because nobody would believe somebody else solely on the basis of 
the latter’s say-so. The suggested mechanisms – not exhaustive – are: legal and regulatory protec-
tion, institutional sources of reputational information, independent rating and evaluation services, 
the intervention of third-party professionals, the adoption of standardised contractual mechanisms 
and using accredited affiliations and credentials as ancillary support. 
None of this is a novelty, and one can identify in the Integrity Pact idea echoes of some of these 
suggestions. The difference lies in the confidence IP practioners place on personal morals and non-
operational provisions as opposed to regulatory conditions and to depersonalised sources of infor-
mation. Evidently, one does not need to subscribe to the present author’s scepticism about the exis-
tence of a place for morals in business in order to accept that the more impersonal information 
there exist about processes and players, the better players are equipped to play. 
* * * 
Due to the scarcity of resources that generally affects civil society organizations, staking one’s bets 
on Integrity Pacts to try to curb corruption in procurement, instead of targeting the institutional 
framework in a given environment, is a strategic decision. While, evidently, if taken under proper 
perspective, IPs may help to achieve cleaner particular tenders in some circumstances, whoever 
adopts them – be it governments or NGOs – as a standing methodology should maintain in mind 
their limitations. 
In any given country, especially if its institutions are weak, the lack of sufficient empirical data on 
procurement in general and on IP-driven tenders in particular precludes reaching conclusions about 
the effectiveness of the methodology, be it in particular instantiations, be it concerning its influ-
ence upon the general environment. If one takes a pragmatic stance and limits oneself to results, 
one is forced to look at places where IPs have been applied and ask whether the respective envi-
ronments experienced changes that could be traced back to the methodology, even if indirectly. 
                                                             
104    [WTO 2003], para. 14. See the minutes of the meeting, available at the WTO website (document 
WT/WGTGP/M/18), for an instructive journey across the resistances of many governments to include anti-
corruption provisions in an agreement about transparency. The European Community document is 
WT/WGTGP/W/41. 
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Lack of data denies an answer. Thus, the fundamental question as to what has been the impact of 
Integrity Pacts in bettering the State’s efficiency in public procurement remains open. 
This means that, while there is no reason to suppose that IPs result in worst outcomes than normal 
procurement or that they deteriorate the overall system, the converse is also true. Even while one 
might maintain an optimistic stance towards the potential worth of the IP general idea, only hard 
information can transform optimism into tenable conviction. Ironically, the best environments 
where to collect and analyse data in order to properly assess the instrument are those, like Seoul 
and some Italian communes, where IPs were institutionalised – and, so, where they are less de-
pendent on NGO participation. 
The many uncertainties surrounding tenders, all of them arising from the financial benefits of win-
ning contracts and incumbent stimuli to collude and to bribe, together with the inconclusiveness 
affecting the IP’s ability to enhance the likelihood of firms refraining from bribing, recommends 
caution when promoting, developing and announcing the results of IPs. In particular, stating that 
IPs lead to “clean” procurement is dangerous. 
The hazard goes far beyond a single instantiation of an IP. If an NGO becomes identified with the 
promotion of IPs, and if it fails to state disclaimers about the actual cleanliness of the procedures 
and other cautionary provisions, then the organization itself becomes fully accountable for the out-
comes, more so if it is paid to do it. What happens, then, if somebody comes up with evidence that 
an IP was corrupted, or did not address a corrupted scheme in the execution phase, or even simply 
led to grossly inefficient results? To argue that none of this would possibly happen, because the 
procedures were governed by an IP, would beg the question. An independent observer would ask a 
host of questions, beginning with the appropriateness of an NGO taking on duties that belong to 
the State and proceeding with case-specific demands for clarification. What possible line of de-
fence could the NGO take that would be any different from a government’s? 
Contrariwise, if the involvement is adequately coached by caution, if the NGO clearly states that it 
cannot vouch for the honesty of the proceedings or the execution’s efficiency, and if information 
on numbers and conditions is collected, aggregated, analysed and publicised, then there would be a 
better chance for independent observers to become convinced that the device is worth trying. 
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